We develop a model in which two firms from different countries compete on each other domestic market. Each firm is jointly owned by the residents and the government of its country. The extent of the government's stake in the public enterprise is endogenous and it determines the weight given to...

We compare the economic efficiency of a publicly-owned utility directly controlled by the government with a publicly-owned utility regulated by a public utility commission (PUC). Regulation by a PUC is modelled as a Nash equilibrium of a game between two principals, the government and the PUC,...

We develop a model in which two firms from different countries compete on each other domestic market. Each firms is jointly owned by the residents and the government of its country. The extent of the government's stake in the public enterprise is endogenous and it determines the weight given the...

Economists have long advised pricing electricity at marginal cost. In the case of public utilities producing from hydraulic sources, this would ordinarily generate a rent that could be used to finance public projects or to lower taxes. But marginal cost pricing by public utilities is rarely...

À cause du cadre réglementaire et des politiques gouvernementales qui s'appliquent à la demande d'énergie, celle-ci a reçu beaucoup d'attention de la part des développeurs de modèles. Dans cet article, je présente un modèle intégré de la demande totale d'énergie. Les principaux...

Investment expenditures in natural gas distribution pipelines account for 70% of the rate base of Société en Commandite Gaz Métropolitain (SCGM), the natural gas utility which serves most customers in the province of Québec. In allocating these costs to rate payers, the regulatory process...

A wide range of tests for heteroskedasticity have been proposed in the econometric and statistics literature. Although a few exact homoskedasticity tests are available, the commonly employed procedures are quite generally based on asymptotic approximations which may not provide good size control...

We consider a firm that must undergo a costly and time-consuming regulatory process before making an irreversible, lagged investment whose value varies randomly. We analyze two cases: regulatory approval is valid forever or it expires after some time. We apply our model to Hydro-Québec's...