We examine whether protectionist trade policies lead to increased bureaucratic corruption. Using multiple measures of corruption and trade policies, we find strong evidence that corruption is significantly higher in countries with protectionist trade policies. These results are robust to...

We examine whether increased trade with countries with ineffective protection of intellectual property has contributed to the skill-deepening of the 1980s. We construct an index of effective protection of intellectual property at the country level, combining data on protection of patents and...

We incorporate demand-side considerations in trade in a systematic but straightforward way. We do so by focusing on the role of inequality in the determination of trade flows and patterns. With non-homothetic preferences, when countries are similar in all respects but asset inequality, we find...

In the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model of endogenous trade protection, sectoral lobbies try to influence an incumbent government that maximizes a weighted sum of political contributions and aggregate welfare. We empirically investigate this model using U.S. and Turkish data. Our specification...