In this paper, interval-type solution concepts for interval-valued cooperative games like the interval core, the interval dominance core and stable sets are introduced and studied. The notion of I-balancedness is introduced, and it is proved that the interval core of an interval-valued...

Different axiomatic systems for the Shapley value can be found in the literature. For games with a coalition structure, the Shapley value also has been axiomatized in several ways. In this paper, we discuss a generalization of the Shapley value to the class of partition function form games. The...

For the class of minimum coloring games (introduced by Deng et al. (1999)) we investigate the existence of population monotonic allocation schemes (introduced by Sprumont (1990)). We show that a minimum coloring game on a graph G has a population monotonic allocation scheme if and only if G is...

The analysis of single-valued solution concepts for coalitional games with transferable utilities has a long tradition. Opposed to most of this literature we will not deal with solution concepts that provide payoffs to the players for the grand coalition only, but we will analyze allocation...

In this paper the existence of Bayesian multi-criteria equilibria in mixed strategies is established for finite Bayesian multi-criteria games.Sufficient conditions are given under which approximate equilibria exist for non-finite Bayesian multi-criteria games

This paper deals with a new class of multi-choice games, the class of multi-choice total clan games. The structure of the core of a multi-choice clan game is explicitly described. Furthermore, characterizations of multi-choice total clan games are given and bi-monotonic allocation schemes...

The lexicographic vectors of a balanced game, called here leximals, are used to define a new solution concept, the lexicore, on the cone of balanced games. Properties of the lexicore and its relation with the core on some classes of games are studied. It is shown that on cones of balanced games...

We consider a market situation with two corners. One corner consists of a single seller with one object, and the other corner consists of potential buyers who all want the object. We suppose that the valuations of the object for the different buyers is known by all of them. Then two cooperative...