The identification of key players in a terrorist network can lead to prevention of attacks, due to efficient allocation of surveillance means or isolation of key players in order to destabilize the network. In this paper we introduce a game theoretic approach to identify key players in terrorist...

This paper explores the manner in which the structure of a social network constrains the level of inequality that can be sustained among its members. We assume that any distribution of value across the network must be stable with respect to coalitional deviations, and that players can form a...

All over the world intelligence services are collecting data concerning possible terrorist threats. This information is usually transformed into network structures in which the nodes represent the individuals in the data set and the links possible connections between these individuals....

Using network control structures this paper introduces network communication games as a generalization of vertex games and edge games corresponding to communication situations and studies their decomposition into unanimity games. We obtain a relation between the dividends of the network...

We introduce a theory on marginal values and their core stability for cooperative games with arbitrary coalition structure. The theory is based on the notion of nested sets and the complex of nested sets associated to an arbitrary set system and the M-extension of a game for this set. For a set...

The core cover of a TU-game is a superset of the core and equals the convex hull of its larginal vectors. A larginal vector corresponds to an order of the players and describes the efficient payoff vector giving the first players in the order their utopia demand as long as it is still possible...

In a deposit game coalitions are formed by players combining their capital. The proceeds of their investments then have to be divided among those players. The current model extends earlier work on capital deposits by allowing reinvestment of returns. Two specific subclasses of deposit games are...

In this paper we consider cooperative transferable utility games with limited communication structure, called graph games. Agents are able to cooperate with each other only if they can communicate directly or indirectly with each other. For the class of acyclic graph games recently the average...

This paper provides an overview of the various shapes the bestreply multifunctions can take in 2x2x2 trimatrix games. It is shown that, unlike in 2x2 bimatrix games, the best replies to the opponents pure strategies do not completely determine the structure of the Nash equilibrium set

In this article we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of Pareto optimal solutions for an N player cooperative infinite horizon differential game. Firstly, we write the problem of finding Pareto candidates as solving N constrained optimal control subproblems. We derive...