This paper deals with cost allocation problems arising from connection situations where edge costs are closed intervals of real numbers. To solve such problems, we extend classical solutions from the theory of minimum cost spanning tree games. We study the properties of such solutions and...

This paper examines several monotonicity properties of value-type interval solutions on the class of convex interval games and focuses on the Dutta-Ray (DR) solution for such games. Well known properties for the classical DR solution are extended to the interval setting. In particular, it is...

In this paper we propose a new rule to allocate risk capital to portfolios or divisions within a firm. Specifically, we determine the capital allocation that minimizes the excesses of sets of portfolios in lexicographical sense. The excess of a set of portfolios is defined as the expected loss...

This paper introduces the family of Weighted Aumann-Shapley values for piecewise linear fuzzy games. The regular Aumann-Shapley value is not well-defined in case some differentiability condition is not satisfied. As an alternative, we introduce a family of allocation rules inspired by the...

Existing literature regarding the natural hedge potential that arises from combining liabilities with different sensitivities focuses on the optimal liability mix, but does not address the question whether and how changes in the liability mix can be obtained. In the absence of a well-functioning...

In this paper two cost sharing solutions for minimum cost spanning tree problems are introduced, the degree adjusted folk solution and the cost adjusted folk solution. These solutions overcome the problem of the classical reductionist folk solution as they have considerable strict ranking power,...

In this paper we consider one-machine sequencing situations with interval data. We present different possible scenarioes and extend classical results on well known rules and on sequencing games to the interval setting

Some new axiomatic characterizations and recursive formulas of the Shapley value are presented. In the results, dual games and the self-duality of the value implicitly play an important role. A set of non-cooperative games which implement the Shapley value on the class of all games is given

In this paper we provide some technical results related to the Lorenz dominance, which allow to prove that the allocation obtained by the algorithm in Dutta and Ray (1989), when exists, and the elements of the equal split-off set always Lorenz dominate every allocation in the core of the game