This paper revisits the Alexia value, a recent solution concept for cooperative transferable utility games. We introduce the dual Alexia value and show that it coincides with the Alexia value for several classes of games. We demonstrate the importance of the notion of compromise stability for...

In this paper minimum coloring games are considered. We characterize the type of conflict graphs inducing simple or three-valued simple minimum coloring games. We provide an upper bound on the number of maximum cliques of conflict graphs inducing such games. Moreover, a characterization of the...

In this paper a new class of relaxed sequencing games is introduced: the class of Step out -- Step in sequencing games. In this relaxation any player within a coalition is allowed to step out from his position in the processing order and to step in at any position later in the processing order....

In this paper we introduce three-valued simple games as a natural extension of simple games. While simple games are used to evaluate single voting systems, three-valued simple games offer the opportunity for a simultaneous analysis of two different voting systems within the same parliamentary...

The core cover of a TU-game is a superset of the core and equals the convex hull of its larginal vectors. A larginal vector corresponds to an order of the players and describes the efficient payoff vector giving the first players in the order their utopia demand as long as it is still possible...

In a deposit game coalitions are formed by players combining their capital. The proceeds of their investments then have to be divided among those players. The current model extends earlier work on capital deposits by allowing reinvestment of returns. Two specific subclasses of deposit games are...

This paper provides an overview of the various shapes the bestreply multifunctions can take in 2x2x2 trimatrix games. It is shown that, unlike in 2x2 bimatrix games, the best replies to the opponents pure strategies do not completely determine the structure of the Nash equilibrium set

In this paper preparation sequencing situations are introduced. This new type of one-machine sequencing situations assumes that before a job can start, some preparation depending on its predecessor is required. Preparation sequencing situations are first analyzed from an operations research...

In this paper we introduce and analyze the procedural egalitarian solution for transferable utility games. This new concept is based on the result of a coalitional bargaining procedure in which egalitarian considerations play a central role. The procedural egalitarian solution is the first...

We consider the problem of computing the influence of a neuronal structure in a brain network. Abraham, Kotter, Krumnack, and Wanke (2006) computed this influence by using the Shapley value of a coalitional game corresponding to a directed network as a rating. Kotter, Reid, Krumnack, Wanke, and...