We associate to each cost spanning tree problem a non-cooperative game, which is inspired by a real-life problem. We study the Nash equilibria and subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game. We prove that these equilibria are closely related with situations where agents connect sequentially to...

We introduce a compromise value for non-transferable utility games: the Chi-compromise value. It is closely related to the Compromise value introduced by Borm, Keiding, McLean, Oortwijn, and Tijs (1992), to the MC-value introduced by Otten, Borm, Peleg, and Tijs (1998), and to the Ω-value...

We study coalitional values for games in generalized characteristic function form. There are two extensions of the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) in this context, one introduced by Nowak and Radzik (1994) and the other introduced by us. We generalize both values to games with a priori unions in...

Multi-issue allocation situations are used to study the problem of having to divide an estate among a group of agents. The claim of each agent is a vector specifying the amount claimed by each agent on each issue. We present several axiomatic characterizations of the constrained equal awards...