We extend the consistency principle for strategic games (Peleg and Tijs (1996)) to apply to solutions which assign to each game a collection of product sets of strategies. Such solutions turn out to satisfy desirable properties that solutions assigning to each game a collection of strategy...

Finite potential games are determined, i.e have Nash equilibria in pure strategies. In this paper we investigate the determinateness of potential games, in which one or more players have infinitely many pure strategies. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1998

The class of Construct and Charge (CC-) rules for minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) situations is considered. CC-rules are defined starting from the notion of charge systems, which specify particular allocation protocols rooted on the Kruskal algorithm for computing an mcst. These protocols can...

We study the relation between the fuzzy core and balancedness for fuzzy games. For regular games, this relation has been studied by Bondareva (Problemy Kibernet 10:119–139, 1963 ) and Shapley (Naval Res Logist Q 14: 453–460, 1967 ). First, we gain insight in this relation when we analyse...

Pareto equilibria in multicriteria games can be computed as the Nash equilibria of scalarized games, obtained by assigning weights to the separate criteria of a player. To analysts, these weights are usually unknown. This paper therefore proposes ideal equilibria, strategy profiles that are...

Kalai and Zemel introduced a class of flow-games showing that these games have a non-empty core and that a minimum cut corresponds to a core allocation.  We consider flow-games with a finite number of players on a network with infinitely many arcs: assuming that the total sum of the capacities...

In this paper we consider standard fixed tree games, for which each vertex unequal to the root is inhabited by exactly one player. We present two weighted allocation rules, the weighted down-home allocation and the weighted neighbour-home allocation, both inspired by the painting story in...

Neighbor games arise from certain matching or sequencing situations in which only some specific pairs of players can obtain a positive gain. As a consequence, the class of neighbor games is the intersection of the class of assignment games (Shapley and Shubik (1972)) and the class of component...

In this paper, the classical theory of two-person cooperative games is extended to two-person cooperative games with interval uncertainty. The core, balancedness, superadditivity and related topics are studied. Solutions called ψ α -values are introduced and characterizations are given....