This paper examines social learning when only one of the two types of decisions is observable. Because agents arrive …, as in the standard model, learning is complete if and only if signals are unbounded. If signals are bounded, cascades may …

makers. We ask whether there exist "full learning'' equilibria - ones in which the players' posterior beliefs eventually …. Surprisingly, in the latter case full learning may be impossible even in the limit as all players become infinitely patient. We …. In this case full learning equilibria exist …

We exhibit a natural environment, social learning among heterogeneous agents, where even slight misperceptions can have … a large negative impact on long-run learning outcomes. We consider a population of agents who obtain information about … information aggregation can be improved by simplifying agents’ learning environment. The key feature behind our findings is that …

We study to what extent information aggregation in social learning environments is robust to slight misperceptions of … the agents' learning environment …

correlation across players. For each information structure, we define a simple learning efficiency index, which only considers the … this index characterizes the speed of common learning (Cripps, Ely, Mailath, and Samuelson, 2008): In particular, the speed … individual learning, and does not depend on the correlation across players’ signals. Second, we build on this characterization to …

learning on the adoption of innovations of uncertain quality. Provided consumers are forward-looking (i.e., recognize the value … opportunities for social learning can slow down adoption and learning and do not increase consumer welfare. We also suggest a novel …