We study infinitely repeated games with observable actions, where players have present-biased (so-called beta-delta) preferences. We give a two-step procedure to characterize Strotz-Pollak equilibrium payoffs: compute the continuation payoff set using recursive techniques, and then use this set...

We introduce and solve a new class of quot;downward-recursivequot; static portfolio choice problems. An individual simultaneously chooses among ranked stochastic options, and each choice is costly. In the motivational application, just one may be exercised from those that succeed. This often...

Consider Becker's 1973 classic matching model, with unobserved fixed types and stochastic publicly observed output. If types are complementary, then matching is assortative in the known Bayesian posteriors (the 'reputations'). We discover a robust failure of Becker's result in the simplest...

The timing of elections is flexible in many countries. We study this optimization, by first creating a Bayesian learning model of a mean-reverting political support process. We then explore optimal electoral timing, modeling it as a renewable American option with interacting waiting and stopping...

There are two varieties of timing games in economics: In a war of attrition, more predecessors helps; in a pre-emption game, more predecessors hurts. In this paper, we introduce and explore a spanning class with 'rank-order payoffs' that subsumes both as special cases. In this environment with...