This paper takes a somewhat different approach from the recent literature in estimating exchange rate equations. It assumes uncovered interest rate parity and models how expectations are formed. Agents are assumed to base their expectations of future interest rates and prices, which are needed...

This paper presents the first empirical investigation of the Multifractal Model of Asset Returns (quot;MMARquot;). The MMAR, developed in Mandelbrot, Fisher, and Calvet (1997) (See Mandelbrot, Fisher, and Calvet, 1997 at the following URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=78588 ), is...

This paper presents the quot;multifractal model of asset returnsquot; (quot;MMARquot;), based upon the pioneering research into multifractal measures by Mandelbrot (1972, 1974). The multifractal model incorporates two elements of Mandelbrot's past research that are now well known in finance....

We define a notion of correlated equilibrium for games with incomplete information in a general setting with finite players, finite actions, and finite states, which we call Bayes correlated equilibrium. The set of Bayes correlated equilibria of a fixed incomplete information game equals the set...

A universal type space of interdependent expected utility preference types is constructed from higher-order preference hierarchies describing (i) an agent's (unconditional) preferences over a lottery space; (ii) the agent's preference over Anscombe-Aumann acts conditional on the unconditional...

This note constructs an efficient mechanism for finding the best candidate for a committee from a sequence of potential candidates. Committee members have independent private values information about the quality of the candidate. The mechanism selects the best candidate according to the standard...

We survey the recent literature on designing auctions and mechanisms for dynamic settings. Two settings are considered: those with a dynamic population of agents whose private information remains fixed throughout time; and those with a fixed population of agents whose private information changes...

We develop a model with many heterogeneous advertisers (products) and advertising markets (media). Each advertiser has a different consumer segment for its product, and each medium has a different ability to target advertisement messages. We characterize the competitive equilibrium in the media...

We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in rationalizable strategies. A strict (and thus stronger) version of the monotonicity condition introduced by Maskin (1999) is necessary under the solution concept of rationalizability. Assuming the social...

We study a dynamic buyer-seller problem in which the good is information and there are no property rights. The potential buyer is reluctant to pay for information whose value to him is uncertain, but the seller cannot credibly convey its value to the buyer without disclosing the information...