Showing 1 - 10 of 71
We provide tight bounds on the rate of convergence of the equilibrium payoff sets for repeated games under both perfect and imperfect public monitoring. The distance between the equilibrium payoff set and its limit vanishes at rate (1 - delta)^{1/2} under perfect monitoring, and at rate (1 -...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013000284
In an economy of interacting agents with both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, we examine how the information … structure determines aggregate volatility. We show that the maximal aggregate volatility is attained in a noise free information … joint distributions over actions and states that can arise in equilibrium under any information structure. This tractable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013052631
which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable generalization of the Vickrey …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012776491
private information influences aggregate volatility. The maximal aggregate volatility is attained in a noise free information … over actions and states that can arise in equilibrium under any information structure. This tractable characterization …, extending results in Bergemann and Morris, can be used to address a wide variety of questions linking information with the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013045592
that hold across all common-prior information structures. The purpose of this letter is to give an informal introduction …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012917973
We study settings in which, prior to playing an incomplete information game, players observe many draws of private … signals about the state from some information structure. Signals are i.i.d. across draws, but may display arbitrary … correlation across players. For each information structure, we define a simple learning efficiency index, which only considers the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013215438
This paper explores the consequences of information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and … Bayesian equilibrium for some information structure. In particular, we characterize maximum and minimum revenue across all … information structures when bidders may not know their own values, and maximum revenue when they do know their values. Revenue is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013017815
We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012992717
We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012982245
We study price discrimination in a market in which two firms engage in Bertrand competition. Some consumers are contested by both firms, and other consumers are “captive” to one of the firms. The market can be divided into segments, which have different relative shares of captive and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012834256