This paper explores the consequences of information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and … Bayesian equilibrium for some information structure. In particular, we characterize maximum and minimum revenue across all … information structures when bidders may not know their own values, and maximum revenue when they do know their values. Revenue is …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders uncertain whether they …

that hold across all common-prior information structures. The purpose of this letter is to give an informal introduction …

We study settings in which, prior to playing an incomplete information game, players observe many draws of private … signals about the state from some information structure. Signals are i.i.d. across draws, but may display arbitrary … correlation across players. For each information structure, we define a simple learning efficiency index, which only considers the …