We study a canonical model of reputation between a long-run player and a sequence of short-run opponents, in which the … long-run player is privately informed about an uncertain state that determines the monitoring structure in the reputation … sufficient conditions (on the monitoring structure and the type space) to obtain reputation building in this setting …

Reputation concerns can discipline agents to take costly effort and generate good outcomes. But what if outcomes are … not always observed? We consider a model of reputation with shifting observability, and ask how this affects agents … reputation incentives and encourage effort. If an agent anticipates that outcomes may not be observed in the future, the benefits …

This paper brings mechanism design to the study of conflict resolution in international relations. We determine when … and how unmediated communication and mediation reduce the ex ante probability of conflict, in a simple game where conflict … is due to asymmetric information. Unmediated communication helps reducing the chance of conflict as it allows conflicting …