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Anderlini, Luca; Gerardi, Dino; Lagunoff, Roger D. - 2008

We study the intergenerational accumulation of knowledge in an infinite-horizon model of communication. Each in a … equilibria do not exist. This is so both in the case of private communication in which each player only hears the message of his … immediate predecessor, and in the case of public communication, in which each player hears the message of all previous players …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014220427

The Persistent Power of Promises

Ederer, Florian - 2018

and online experiment to provide the first evidence for the persistent power of communication. Even when 3 weeks pass … between messages and actual choices, communication raises cooperation, trust, and trustworthiness by about 50 percent. Lags …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012920309

Social Memory and Evidence from the Past

Anderlini, Luca - 2008

Examples of repeated destructive behavior abound throughout the history of human societies. This paper examines the role of social memory -- a society's vicarious beliefs about the past -- in creating and perpetuating destructive conflicts. We examine whether such behavior is consistent with the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012773656

Incentives for Experimenting Agents

Hörner, Johannes; Samuelson, Larry - 2009

We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The agent's actions are hidden, and the principal, who makes the offers, cannot commit to future actions. We identify the unique Markovian...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014204396

Subjectivity in Inductive Inference

Gilboa, Itzhak; Samuelson, Larry - 2009

This paper examines circumstances under which subjectivity enhances the effectiveness of inductive reasoning. We consider a game in which Fate chooses a data generating process and agents are characterized by inference rules that may be purely objective (or data-based) or may incorporate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014204472

Matching with Incomplete Information

Liu, Quingmin; Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; … - 2012

A large literature uses matching models to analyze markets with two-sided heterogeneity, studying problems such as the matching of students to schools, residents to hospitals, husbands to wives, and workers to firms. The analysis typically assumes that the agents have complete information, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014166273

Incentives for Experimenting Agents

Hörner, Johannes - 2013

We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The repeated interaction gives rise to a dynamic agency cost — the more lucrative is the agent's stream of future rents following a failure,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013084929

The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd : Model-Based Inference

Mailath, George J. - 2019

``Crowds'' are often regarded as ``wiser'' than individuals, and prediction markets are often regarded as effective methods for harnessing this wisdom. If the agents in prediction markets are Bayesians who share a common model and prior belief, then the no-trade theorem implies that we should...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012894762

Inflationary Equilibrium in a Stochastic Economy with Independent Agents

Geanakoplos, John - 2009

We argue that even when macroeconomic variables are constant, underlying microeconomic uncertainty and borrowing constraints generate inflation.We study stochastic economies with fiat money, a central bank, one nondurable commodity, countably many time periods, and a continuum of agents. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013158766

Incentives for Experimenting Agents

Hörner, Johannes - 2012

We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The agent's actions are hidden, and the principal cannot commit to future actions. The repeated interaction gives rise to a dynamic agency...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013111103