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Anderlini, Luca; Gerardi, Dino; Lagunoff, Roger D. - 2008

We study the intergenerational accumulation of knowledge in an infinite-horizon model of communication. Each in a … equilibria do not exist. This is so both in the case of private communication in which each player only hears the message of his … immediate predecessor, and in the case of public communication, in which each player hears the message of all previous players …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014220427

Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games

Horner, Johannes - 2015

This paper characterizes an equilibrium payoff subset for dynamic Bayesian games as discounting vanishes. Monitoring is imperfect, transitions may depend on actions, types may be correlated and values may be interdependent. The focus is on equilibria in which players report truthfully. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013029918

Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games

Horner, Johannes - 2013

This paper characterizes an equilibrium payoff subset for Markovian games with private information as discounting vanishes. Monitoring is imperfect, transitions may depend on actions, types be correlated and values interdependent. The focus is on equilibria in which players report truthfully....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013071462

Social Memory and Evidence from the Past

Anderlini, Luca - 2008

Examples of repeated destructive behavior abound throughout the history of human societies. This paper examines the role of social memory -- a society's vicarious beliefs about the past -- in creating and perpetuating destructive conflicts. We examine whether such behavior is consistent with the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012773656

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - 2011

We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions which are valid for, and in this sense robust to, all possible private information structures that the agents may have. We completely characterize the set of Bayes correlated equilibria in a class of games with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014175012

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - 2011

We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions which are valid for all possible private information structures that the agents may have. Our characterization of these robust predictions relies on an epistemic result which establishes a relationship between the set...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014177259

Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games : An Algorithm for delta Approaching 1 and a Folk Theorem

Horner, Johannes; Sugaya, Takuo; Takahashi, Satoru; … - 2013

We present an algorithm to compute the set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs as the discount factor tends to one for stochastic games with observable states and public (but not necessarily perfect) monitoring when the limiting set of (long-run players') equilibrium payoffs is independent of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014045865

Belief-Free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information : Characterization and Existence

Hörner, Johannes; Lovo, Stefano M.; Tomala, Tristan - 2013

We characterize belief-free equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information with N \ge 2 players and arbitrary information structures. This characterization involves a new type of individual rational constraint linking the lowest equilibrium payoffs across players. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014046016

On a Markov Game with One-Sided Incomplete Information

Horner, Johannes; Rosenberg, Dinah; Solan, Eilon; … - 2013

We apply the average cost optimality equation to zero-sum Markov games, by considering a simple game with one-sided incomplete information that generalizes an example of Aumann and Maschler (1995). We determine the value and identify the optimal strategies for a range of parameters

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014046017

Price Dynamics on a Stock Market with Asymmetric Information

De Meyer, Bernard - 2007

The appearance of a Brownian term in the price dynamics on a stock market was interpreted in [De Meyer, Moussa-Saley (2003)] as a consequence of the informational asymmetries between agents. To take benefit of their private information without revealing it to fast, the informed agents have to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014052529