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Endogenous Beliefs and Institutional Structure in Competitive Equilibrium with Adverse Selection

Jaynes, Gerald David - 2019

I model ﬁnancial markets that structure decision-making into discrete points separating contract oﬀers, applications, and acceptance/denial decisions. Endogenous beliefs about applicants' risk types emerge as the institutional process extracts private information allowing uninformed ﬁrms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012895149

Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information

Vives, Xavier - 2009

A finite number of sellers (n) compete in schedules to supply an elastic demand. The costs of the sellers have uncertain common and private value components and there is no exogenous noise in the system. A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized; the equilibrium is privately...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014202206

Transparency and distressed sales under asymmetric information

Fuchs, William; Öry, Aniko; Skrzypacz, Andrzej - 2015 - Draft: February 6, 2015

We analyze price transparency in a dynamic market with private information and correlated values. Uninformed buyers compete inter- and intra-temporarily for a good sold by an informed seller suffering a liquidity shock. We contrast public versus private price offers. In a two-period case all...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011862024

Non-Exclusive Insurance with Free Entry : A Pedagogical Note

Dubey, Pradeep K. - 2019

We consider the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of insurance but without the exclusivity constraint. It turns out that there … always exists a unique equilibrium, in which the reliable and unreliable consumers take out a primary insurance up to its … quantity limit, and the unreliable take out further secondary insurance at a higher premium. We provide a simple proof of this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012892349

Affective Decision-Making : A Theory of Optimism-Bias

Bracha, Anat; Brown, Donald J. - 2010

demonstrate this finding for affective decision making in insurance markets. We prove that ADM potential games are refutable, by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014196549

Estimation and Model Selection of Semiparametric Multivariate Survival Functions under General Censorship

Chen, Xiaohong - 2008

general censorship. An empirical application of the model selection test to the Loss-ALAE insurance data set is provided …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012768392

Risky Curves : From Unobservable Utility to Observable Opportunity Sets

Friedman, Daniel - 2017

-based industries such as finance, insurance and gambling. We sketch an alternative approach to modeling risky choice that focuses on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012975977

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - 2011

We define a notion of correlated equilibrium for games with incomplete information in a general setting with finite players, finite actions, and finite states, which we call Bayes correlated equilibrium. The set of Bayes correlated equilibria of a fixed incomplete information game equals the set...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014176751

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen; Takahashi, Satoru - 2011

A universal type space of interdependent expected utility preference types is constructed from higher-order preference hierarchies describing (i) an agent's (unconditional) preferences over a lottery space; (ii) the agent's preference over Anscombe-Aumann acts conditional on the unconditional...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014185594

Efficient Search by Committee

Bergemann, Dirk; Välimäki, Juuso - 2011

This note constructs an efficient mechanism for finding the best candidate for a committee from a sequence of potential candidates. Committee members have independent private values information about the quality of the candidate. The mechanism selects the best candidate according to the standard...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014186581