A vast theoretical literature shows that inefficient market structures may arise in free entry equilibria. Previous empirical work demonstrated that excessive entry may obtain in local radio markets. Our paper extends that literature by relaxing the assumption that stations are symmetric,...

This paper investigates the impact of spatial zoning restrictions on retail market outcomes. We estimate a structural model of entry, location and format choice across a large number of markets in the presence of zoning restrictions. The paper contributes to the literature in three ways: First,...

A finite number of sellers (n) compete in schedules to supply an elastic demand. The costs of the sellers have uncertain common and private value components and there is no exogenous noise in the system. A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized; the equilibrium is privately...

When firms first choose capacity and then compete on prices in a series of advance-purchase markets, we show that strong competitive forces prevent firms from utilizing intertemporal price discrimination. We then enrich the model by allowing firms to use inventory controls, or sales limits...

This paper develops a strategy with simple implementation and limited data requirements to identify spatial distortion of supply from demand – or, equivalently, unequal access to supply among regions – in transportation markets. We apply our method to ride-level, multi-platform data from New...

This paper develops an oligopoly model in which firms first choose capacity and then compete in prices in a series of advance-purchase markets. We show that when the elasticity of demand falls across periods, strong competitive forces prevent firms from utilizing intertemporal price...

We show that intermediate goods can be sourced to firms on the quot;outsidequot; (that do not compete in the final product market), even when there are no economies of scale or cost advantages for these firms. What drives the phenomenon is that quot;insidequot; firms, by accepting such orders,...

We define and examine the performance of three minimal strategic market games (sell-all, buy-sell, and double auction) in laboratory relative to the predictions of theory. Unlike open or partial equilibrium settings of most other experiments, these closed exchange economies have limited amounts...

We define and examine three minimal market games (sell-all, buy-sell, and double auction) in the laboratory relative to the predictions of theory. These closed exchange economies have some cash to facilitate transactions, and include feedback. The experiment reveals that (1) the competitive...