Similar Search Results

Bergemann, Dirk; Välimäki, Juuso - 2011

This note constructs an efficient mechanism for finding the best candidate for a committee from a sequence of potential candidates. Committee members have independent private values information about the quality of the candidate. The mechanism selects the best candidate according to the standard...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014186581

Resistance to Institutions and Cultural Distance : Brigandage in Post-Unification Italy

Lecce, Giampaolo - 2017

We study how cultural distance affects the rejection of imposed institutions. To this purpose, we exploit the … transplantation of Piedmontese institutions on Southern Italy which occurred during the Italian unification. We assemble a novel and … transplanted institutions is significantly associated with more intense resistance to these institutions. Our results further …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012950663

Resistance to Institutions and Cultural Distance : Brigandage in Post-Unification Italy

Lecce, Giampaolo - 2017

We study how cultural distance affects the rejection of imposed institutions. To do so, we exploit the transplantation … of Piedmontese institutions on Southern Italy that occurred during the Italian unification. We assemble a novel and … transplanted institutions is significantly associated with more intense resistance to these institutions. Our results further …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012941053

Wages and Informality in Developing Countries

Meghir, Costas - 2012

It is often argued that informal labor markets in developing countries promote growth by reducing the impact of regulation. On the other hand informality may reduce the amount of social protection offered to workers. We extend the wage-posting framework of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) to allow...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013101150

Financial Control of a Competitive Economy without Randomness

Karatzas, Ioannis; Shubik, Martin; Sudderth, William D. - 2008

The monetary and fiscal control of a simple economy without outside randomness is studied here from the micro-economic basis of a strategic market game. The government's bureaucracy is treated as a public good that provides services at a cost. A conventional public good is also considered

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014213408

Embedding Cooperation in General-Equilibrium Models

Roemer, John E. - 2017

Humans cooperate a great deal in economic activity, but our two major models of equilibrium – Walrasian competitive in markets and Nash in games – portray us as only non-cooperative. In earlier work, I have proposed a model of cooperative decision making (Kantian optimization); here, I embed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012950090

Intra-Household Welfare

Chiappori, Pierre-André - 2014

In this paper we develop an approach to measuring inequality and poverty that recognizes the fact that individuals within households may have both different preferences and differential access to resources. We argue that a measure based on estimates of the sharing rule is inadequate as an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013053289

Intrahousehold Inequality

Chiappori, Pierre-André - 2014

Studies of inequality often ignore resource allocation within the household. In doing so they miss an important element of the distribution of welfare that can vary dramatically depending on overall environmental and economic factors. Thus, measures of inequality that ignore intra household...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013053293

U.S. Infrastructure : 1929-2017

Fair, Ray C. - 2019

This paper examines the history of U.S. infrastructure since 1929 and in the process reports an interesting fact about the U.S. economy. Infrastructure as a percent of GDP began a steady decline around 1970, and the government budget deﬁcit became positive and large at roughly the same time....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012865187

Overcoming Participation Constraints

Fang, Hanming - 2008

This paper shows that linking a sufficiently large number of independent but unrelated social decisions can achieve approximate efficiency. We provide regularity conditions under which a Groves mechanism amended with a veto game implements an efficient outcome with probability arbitrarily close...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012774203