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Reputation Building Under Uncertain Monitoring

Deb, Joyee - 2016

We study a canonical model of reputation between a long-run player and a sequence of short-run opponents, in which the … long-run player is privately informed about an uncertain state that determines the monitoring structure in the reputation … sufficient conditions (on the monitoring structure and the type space) to obtain reputation building in this setting …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012990091

Reputation with Opportunities for Coasting

Deb, Joyee - 2016

Reputation concerns can discipline agents to take costly effort and generate good outcomes. But what if outcomes are … not always observed? We consider a model of reputation with shifting observability, and ask how this affects agents … reputation incentives and encourage effort. If an agent anticipates that outcomes may not be observed in the future, the benefits …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012990092

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - 2011

We define a notion of correlated equilibrium for games with incomplete information in a general setting with finite players, finite actions, and finite states, which we call Bayes correlated equilibrium. The set of Bayes correlated equilibria of a fixed incomplete information game equals the set...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014176751

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen; Takahashi, Satoru - 2011

A universal type space of interdependent expected utility preference types is constructed from higher-order preference hierarchies describing (i) an agent's (unconditional) preferences over a lottery space; (ii) the agent's preference over Anscombe-Aumann acts conditional on the unconditional...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014185594

Efficient Search by Committee

Bergemann, Dirk; Välimäki, Juuso - 2011

This note constructs an efficient mechanism for finding the best candidate for a committee from a sequence of potential candidates. Committee members have independent private values information about the quality of the candidate. The mechanism selects the best candidate according to the standard...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014186581

Dynamic Auctions : A Survey

Bergemann, Dirk; Said, Maher - 2010

We survey the recent literature on designing auctions and mechanisms for dynamic settings. Two settings are considered: those with a dynamic population of agents whose private information remains fixed throughout time; and those with a fixed population of agents whose private information changes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014195204

Targeting in Advertising Markets : Implications for Offline vs. Online Media

Bergemann, Dirk; Bonatti, Alessandro - 2010

We develop a model with many heterogeneous advertisers (products) and advertising markets (media). Each advertiser has a different consumer segment for its product, and each medium has a different ability to target advertisement messages. We characterize the competitive equilibrium in the media...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014196729

Rationalizable Implementation

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen; Tercieux, Olivier - 2010

We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in rationalizable strategies. A strict (and thus stronger) version of the monotonicity condition introduced by Maskin (1999) is necessary under the solution concept of rationalizability. Assuming the social...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199374

Selling Information

Hörner, Johannes; Skrzypacz, Andrzej - 2010

We study a dynamic buyer-seller problem in which the good is information and there are no property rights. The potential buyer is reluctant to pay for information whose value to him is uncertain, but the seller cannot credibly convey its value to the buyer without disclosing the information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199658

Biased Social Learning

Herrera, Helios; Hörner, Johannes - 2014

This paper examines social learning when only one of the two types of decisions is observable. Because agents arrive randomly over time, and only those who invest are observed, later agents face a more complicated inference problem than in the standard model, as the absence of investment might...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014201514