This paper explores the consequences of information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily …

good must be sold, then the optimal mechanism is simply a posted price at which all bidders are willing to purchase the … favor of bidders with lower signals. In some cases, the optimal mechanism again reduces to a posted price. The model …

We revisit the revenue comparison of standard auction formats, including first-price, second-price, and English …, and English auctions all have the same revenue guarantee, which is equal to that of the first-price auction as … the symmetric affiliated models of Milgrom and Weber (1982) and monotonic pure-strategy equilibria, first-price, second-price …

A single unit of a good is to be sold by auction to one of two buyers. The good has either a high value or a low value …, with known prior probabilities. The designer of the auction knows the prior over values but is uncertain about the correct … model of the buyers' beliefs. The designer evaluates a given auction design by the lowest expected revenue that would be …

We study auction design when bidders have a pure common value equal to the maximum of their independent signals. In the … reduces to a posted price under which all bidders are equally likely to get the good. This model of pure common values can … equivalently be interpreted as model of resale: the bidders have independent private values at the auction stage, and the winner of …

sequential disclosure rule, implemented in an ascending price auction. In the optimal disclosure mechanism, each losing bidder …We consider the design of an optimal auction in which the seller can determine the allocation and the disclosure rule … learns his true valuation, but the winning bidder only learns that his valuation is sufficiently high to win the auction. We …

the disclosure policy. A sequential disclosure rule is shown to implement an ascending price auction in which each losing …We propose a sequential auction mechanism for a single object in which the seller jointly determines the allocation and … bidder learns his true valuation, but the winning bidder's information is truncated from below. As the auction ends, the …