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Bergemann, Dirk - 2017

minimal disclosure regime each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction. In equilibrium the allocation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012948369

Should Auctions Be Transparent?

Bergemann, Dirk - 2010

independent values across bidders. The values are assumed to be perfectly persistent over time.We analyze the first-price auction … disclosure regime, in which each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction at the end of each round. In … equilibrium, the winner of the initial auction lowers his bids over time, while losers keep their bids constant, in anticipation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013139373

Should Auctions Be Transparent?

Bergemann, Dirk - 2014

minimal disclosure regime each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction. In equilibrium the allocation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013047743

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2015

This paper explores the consequences of information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over valuations, we characterize the set of possible outcomes that can arise in a Bayesian equilibrium for some information structure. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013017815

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2016

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over values, we characterize the lowest winning-bid distribution that can arise across all information structures and equilibria. The information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012992717

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012982245

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2015

We explore the impact of private information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over values, we characterize the lowest winning bid distribution that can arise across all information structures and equilibria. The information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013011350

Nonparametric Tests of Conditional Treatment Effects

Lee, Sokbae; Whang, Yoon-jae - 2009

We develop a general class of nonparametric tests for treatment effects conditional on covariates. We consider a wide spectrum of null and alternative hypotheses regarding conditional treatment effects, including (i) the null hypothesis of the conditional stochastic dominance between treatment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014201084

Semiparametric Efficiency Bound for Models of Sequential Moment Restrictions Containing Unknown Functions

Ai, Chunrong; Chen, Xiaohong - 2009

This paper computes the semiparametric efficiency bound for finite dimensional parameters identified by models of sequential moment restrictions containing unknown functions. Our results extend those of Chamberlain (1992b) and Ai and Chen (2003) for semiparametric conditional moment restriction...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014203169

Nonparametric Estimation in Random Coefficients Binary Choice Models

Gautier, Eric; Kitamura, Yuichi - 2009

This paper considers random coefficients binary choice models. The main goal is to estimate the density of the random coefficients nonparametrically. This is an ill-posed inverse problem characterized by an integral transform. A new density estimator for the random coefficients is developed,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014204704