Similar Search Results

Getting at Systemic Risk Via an Agent-Based Model of the Housing Market

Geanakoplos, John - 2012

Systemic risk must include the housing market, though economists have not generally focused on it. We begin construction of an agent-based model of the housing market with individual data from Washington, DC. Twenty years of success with agent-based models of mortgage prepayments give us hope...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013109559

Continuous Workout Mortgages

Shiller, Robert J. - 2011

This paper models Continuous Workout Mortgages (CWMs) in an economic environment with refinancings and prepayments by employing a market-observable variable such as the house price index of the pertaining locality. Our main results include: (a) explicit modelling of repayment and interest-only...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013126511

Continuous Workout Mortgages : Efficient Pricing and Systemic Implications

Shiller, Robert J. - 2018

This paper studies the Continuous Workout Mortgage (CWM), a two in one product: a fixed rate home loan coupled with negative equity insurance, to advocate its viability in mitigating financial fragility. In order to tackle the many issues that CWMs embrace, we perform a range of tasks. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012931545

A New Hedonic Regression for Real Estate Prices Applied to the Singapore Residential Market

Jiang, Liang - 2014

This paper develops a new hedonic method for constructing a real estate price index that utilizes all transaction price information that encompasses both single-sale and repeat-sale properties. The new method is less prone to specification errors than standard hedonic methods and uses all...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013043163

Should Auctions Be Transparent?

Bergemann, Dirk - 2017

minimal disclosure regime each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction. In equilibrium the allocation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012948369

Should Auctions Be Transparent?

Bergemann, Dirk - 2010

independent values across bidders. The values are assumed to be perfectly persistent over time.We analyze the first-price auction … disclosure regime, in which each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction at the end of each round. In … equilibrium, the winner of the initial auction lowers his bids over time, while losers keep their bids constant, in anticipation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013139373

Should Auctions Be Transparent?

Bergemann, Dirk - 2014

minimal disclosure regime each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction. In equilibrium the allocation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013047743

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2015

This paper explores the consequences of information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over valuations, we characterize the set of possible outcomes that can arise in a Bayesian equilibrium for some information structure. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013017815

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2016

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over values, we characterize the lowest winning-bid distribution that can arise across all information structures and equilibria. The information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012992717

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012982245