This note examines the effect of changes in risk aversion on the optimal portfolio choice in a complete market. It is shown that an agent who is less risk averse in the Pratt (1964) sense than another will choose a portfolio whose payoff is distributed as the other's payoff plus a nonnegative...

Market participants' risk attitudes, wealth and portfolio composition influence their positions in a pegged foreign currency and, therefore, may have important effects on the sustainability of currency pegs. We analyze such effects in a global game model of currency crises with continuous action...

We analyze the effect of risk aversion, wealth and portfolios on the behavior of investors in a global game model of currency crises with continuous action choices. The model generates a rich set of striking theoretical predictions. For example, risk aversion makes currency crises significantly...

This paper uses data on companies that have been in the S&P 500 index since 1957 to examine whether risk aversion has decreased since 1995. The evidence suggests that it has not. There is no evidence that more risky companies have had larger increases in their price-earnings ratios since 1995...

Most theories of risky choice postulate that a decision maker maximizes the expectation of a Bernoulli (or utility or similar) function. We tour 60 years of empirical search and conclude that no such functions have yet been found that are useful for out-of-sample prediction. Nor do we find...

Affective decision-making (ADM) is a refutable and predictive theory of individual choice under risk and uncertainty. It generalizes expected utility theory by positing the existence of two cognitive processes -- the "rational" and the "emotional" process. Observed choice is the result of their...

Why did evolution not give us a utility function that is offspring alone? Why do we care intrinsically about other outcomes, such as food, and what determines the intensity of such preferences? A common view is that such other outcomes enhance fitness and the intensity of our preference for a...

Why did evolution not give us a utility function that is offspring alone? Why do we care intrinsically about other outcomes, food, for example, and what determines the intensity of such preferences? A common view is that such other outcomes enhance fitness and the intensity of our preference for...

This paper provides an evolutionary foundation for our capacity to attribute preferences to others. This ability is intrinsic to game theory, and is a key component of "Theory of Mind", perhaps the capstone of social cognition. We argue here that this component of theory of mind allows organisms...

This paper investigates the evolutionary foundation for our capacity to attribute preferences to others. This ability is intrinsic to game theory, and is a key component of "Theory of Mind," perhaps the capstone of social cognition. We argue here that this component of theory of mind allows...