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Anderlini, Luca; Gerardi, Dino; Lagunoff, Roger - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2008

We study the intergenerational accumulation of knowledge in an infinite-horizon model of communication. Each in a … equilibria do not exist. This is so both in the case of private communication in which each player only hears the message of his … immediate predecessor, and in the case of public communication, in which each player hears the message of all previous players …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593160

A Stochastic Overlapping Generations Economy with Inheritance

Karatzas, Ioannis; Shubik, Martin; Sudderth, William D. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2000

An overlapping generations model of an exchange economy is considered, with individuals having a finite expected life-span. Conditions concerning birth, death, inheritance and bequests are fully specified. Under such conditions, the existence of stationary Markov equilibrium is established in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990769

Information and the Existence of Stationary Markovian Equilibrium

Karatzas, Ioannis; Shubik, Martin; Sudderth, William D. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2000

We describe conditions for the existence of a stationary Markovian equilibrium when total production or total endowment is a random variable. Apart from regularity assumptions, there are two crucial conditions: (i) low information -- agents are ignorant of both total endowment and their own...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087407

Unmediated Communication in Games with Complete and Incomplete Information

Gerardi, Dino - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2002

In this paper we study the effects of adding unmediated communication to static, finite games of complete and …^{U}(G) is equal to the set of communication equilibria of G. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762546

Social Memory and Evidence from the Past

Anderlini, Luca; Gerardi, Dino; Lagunoff, Roger - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2007

Examples of repeated destructive behavior abound throughout the history of human societies. This paper examines the role of social memory -- a society's vicarious beliefs about the past -- in creating and perpetuating destructive conflicts. We examine whether such behavior is consistent with the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005093959

Dynamic Marginal Contribution Mechanism

Bergemann, Dirk; Valimaki, Juuso - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2007

We consider truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in a dynamic private value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable generalization of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each agent. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463896

Price Dynamics on a Stock Market with Asymmetric Information

Meyer, Bernard De - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2007

The appearance of a Brownian term in the price dynamics on a stock market was interpreted in [De Meyer, Moussa-Saley (2003)] as a consequence of the informational asymmetries between agents. To take benefit of their private information without revealing it to fast, the informed agents have to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463901

The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism

Bergemann, Dirk; Valimaki, Juuso - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2008

We consider truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in an independent private-value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable generalization of the pivot mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each agent. In the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463962

Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games

Horner, Johannes; Takahashi, Satoru; Vieille, Nicolas - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013

This paper characterizes an equilibrium payoff subset for dynamic Bayesian games as discounting vanishes. Monitoring is imperfect, transitions may depend on actions, types may be correlated and values may be interdependent. The focus is on equilibria in which players report truthfully. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011123506

Nonlinear Pricing with Finite Information

Bergemann, Dirk; Shen, Ji; Xu, Yun; Yeh, Edmund M. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2015

of possible valuations. The menu is limited to offering a finite number of choices representing a finite communication …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011124281