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Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem

Caplin, Andrew; Nalebuff, Barry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1990

, this conclusion does not extend to elections in which candidates differ in more than one dimension. This paper provides a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593158

Kantian Optimization: An Approach to Cooperative Behavior

Roemer, John E. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2012

Although evidence accrues in biology, anthropology and experimental economics that homo sapiens is a cooperative species, the reigning assumption in economic theory is that individuals optimize in an autarkic manner (as in Nash and Walrasian equilibrium). I here postulate a cooperative kind of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895664

Kantian Optimization, Social Ethos, and Pareto Efficiency

Roemer, John E. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895680

Promises and Expectations

Ederer, Florian; Stremitzer, Alexander - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013

We investigate why people keep their promises in the absence of external enforcement mechanisms and reputational effects. In a controlled laboratory experiment we show that exogenous variation of second-order expectations (promisors' expectations about promisees' expectations that the promise...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011252589

I'll See It When I Believe It - A Simple Model of Cognitive Consistency

Yariv, Leeat - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2002

Psychological experiments demonstrate that people exhibit a taste for consistency. Individuals are inclined to interpret new evidence in ways that confirm their pre-existing beliefs. They also tend to change their beliefs to enhance the desirability of their past actions. I present a model that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463891

Optimal Electoral Timing: Exercise Wisely and You May Live Longer

Keppo, Jussi; Smith, Lones; Davydov, Dmitry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2006

In many democratic countries, the timing of elections is flexible. We explore this potentially valuable option using …-Tory rivalry in the U.K., with polling data from 1943-2005 and the 16 elections after 1945. Excluding three elections essentially … forced by weak governments, our maximizing story quite well explains when the elections were called, and beats simple linear …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463899

Xenophobia and Distribution in France: A Politico-economic Analysis

Roemer, John E.; Straeten, Karen Van der - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2004

Anti-immigrant feeling (xenophobia) among voters has been proposed as a key factor explaining why, in the 2002 French national election, Jean Le Pen’s National Front Party won second place. Here, we study the effect of anti-immigrant sentiments among voters on the equilibrium position of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990773

Does Democracy Engender Justice?

Roemer, John E. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2001

Many suppose that democracy is an ethos which includes, inter alia, a degree of economic equality among citizens. In contrast, we conceive of democracy as ruthless political competition between groups of citizens, organized into parties. We inquire whether such competition, which we assume to be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990841

Political Equilibrium With Private or/and Public Campaign Finance: A Comparison Of Institutions

Roemer, John E. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2003

We propose a theory of party competition (two parties, single-issue) where citizens acquire party membership by contributing money to a party, and where a member?s influence on the policy taken by her party is proportional to her campaign contribution. The polity consists of informed and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005093946

Committee Design in the Presence of Communication

Gerardi, Dino; Yariv, Leeat - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2003

The goal of this paper is to introduce communication in a collective choice environment with information acquisition. We concentrate on decision panels that are comprised of agents sharing a common goal and having a joint task. Members of the panel decide whether to acquire costly information or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087382