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Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen; Takahashi, Satoru - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2010

We identify a universal type space of possible interdependent (expected utility) preferences of a group of agents satisfying two criteria. First, a type consists of a "detail free" description, in a natural language, of the agents' interdependent preferences. Second, distinct types in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895695

Social Memory and Evidence from the Past

Anderlini, Luca; Gerardi, Dino; Lagunoff, Roger - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2007

Examples of repeated destructive behavior abound throughout the history of human societies. This paper examines the role of social memory -- a society's vicarious beliefs about the past -- in creating and perpetuating destructive conflicts. We examine whether such behavior is consistent with the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005093959

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen; Takahashi, Satoru - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2010

A universal type space of interdependent expected utility preference types is constructed from higher-order preference hierarchies describing (i) an agent's (unconditional) preferences over a lottery space; (ii) the agent's preference over Anscombe-Aumann acts conditional on the unconditional...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008854041

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen; Takahashi, Satoru - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008677116

Market Diffusion with Two-Sided Learning

Bergemann, Dirk; Valimaki, Juuso - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1996

The diffusion of a new product of uncertain value is analyzed in a duopolistic market in continuous time. The two sides of the market, buyers and sellers, learn the true value of the new product over time as a result of experimentation. Buyers have heterogeneous preferences over the products and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463873

Monopoly Pricing of Experience Goods

Bergemann, Dirk; Valimaki, Juuso - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2004

learning and turnover among buyers. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990828

Collaborating

Bonatti, Alessandro; Horner, Johannes - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009

This paper examines moral hazard in teams over time. Agents are collectively engaged in an uncertain project, and their individual efforts are unobserved. Free-riding leads not only to a reduction in effort, but also to procrastination. The collaboration dwindles over time, but never ceases as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005000297

Market Experimentation and Pricing

Bergemann, Dirk; Valimaki, Juuso - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1996

We present a continuous-time model of Bayesian learning in a duopolistic market. Initially the value of one product … externality leads to too much learning. Buyers do not consider the impact of their experimentation on other buyers while the … and allocations in this two-sided learning model. The analysis is presented for a finite number of buyers as well as for a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005093954

The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping

Bergemann, Dirk; Hege, Ulrich - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2001

This paper considers the financing of a research project under uncertainty about the time of completion and the probability of eventual success. The uncertainty about future success gradually diminishes with the arrival of addtional funding. The entrepreneur controls the funds and can divert...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087360

Communication and Learning

Anderlini, Luca; Gerardi, Dino; Lagunoff, Roger - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2008

makers. We ask whether there exist "full learning'' equilibria -- ones in which the players' posterior beliefs eventually …. Surprisingly, in the latter case full learning may be impossible even in the limit as all players become infinitely patient. We …. In this case full learning equilibria exist. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593160