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Fang, Hanming; Moscarini, Giuseppe - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2003

overconfidence on the firm's optimal wage-setting policies. In our model, wage contracts both provide incentives and affect worker …-differentiation wage policy to be profit-maximizing. In numerical examples, worker overconfidence is a necessary condition for the firm to … more worker overconfidence; finally, wage compression is more likely when aggregate productivity is low. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762554

Competitive Pooling: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered

Dubey, Pradeep; Geanakoplos, John - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2001

's deliveries are the same at all pools. The Rothschild-Stiglitz model of insurance is included as a special case. We show that by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990814

Competitive Pooling: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered

Dubey, Pradeep; Geanakoplos, John - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2001

's deliveries are the same at all pools. The Rothschild-Stiglitz model of insurance is included as a special case. We show that by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593561

Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission

Golosov, Mikhail; Skreta, Vasiliki; Tsyvinski, Aleh; … - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2011

This paper studies strategic information transmission in a dynamic environment where, each period, a privately informed expert sends a message and a decision maker takes an action. Our main result is that, in contrast to a static environment, full information revelation is possible. The gradual...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009019140

An Ascending Auction for Independent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2007

We consider an single object auction environment with interdependent valuations and a generalized Vickrey-Clark-Groves allocation mechanism that allocates the object almost efficiently in a strict ex post equilibrium. If there is a significant amount of interdependence, there are multiple...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463846

Vertical Integration: Networks, and Markets

Kranton, Rachel E.; Minehart, Deborah F. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1999

The organization of supply relations varies across industries. This paper builds a theoretical framework to compare three alternative supply structures: vertical integration, networks, and markets. The analysis considers the relationship between uncertainty in demand for specific inputs,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463854

Signalling and Default: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered

Dubey, Pradeep; Geanakoplos, John - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2001

asset sales, we obtain a perfectly competitive version of the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of insurance. In our model their …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463898

Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium

Dubey, Pradeep; Geanakoplos, John; Shubik, Martin - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2001

We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by thinking of assets as pools. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463908

Multidimensional Private Value Auctions

Fang, Hanming; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2003

We consider parametric examples of two-bidder private value auctions in which each bidder observes her own private valuation as well as noisy signals about her opponentÌs private valuation. In such multidimensional private value auction environments, we show that the revenue equivalence between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463947

Ex Post Implementation

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2005

We analyze the problem of fully implementing a social choice set in ex post equilibrium. Weidentify an ex post monotonicity condition that is necessary and -- in economic environments -- sufficient for full implementation in ex post equilibrium. We also identify an ex post monotonicityno veto...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463973