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Nonlinear Pricing with Finite Information

Bergemann, Dirk; Shen, Ji; Xu, Yun; Yeh, Edmund M. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2015

We analyze nonlinear pricing with finite information. A seller offers a menu to a continuum of buyers with a continuum of possible valuations. The menu is limited to offering a finite number of choices representing a finite communication capacity between buyer and seller. We identify necessary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011124281

Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design with Limited Information

Bergemann, Dirk; Shen, Ji; Xu, Yun; Yeh, Edmund M. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2012

We analyze a nonlinear pricing model with limited information. Each buyer can purchase a large variety, d, of goods. His preference for each good is represented by a scalar and his preference over d goods is represented by a d-dimensional vector. The type space of each buyer is given by a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895638

Mechanism Design with Limited Information: The Case of Nonlinear Pricing

Bergemann, Dirk; Shen, Ji; Xu, Yun; Yeh, Edmund M. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2010

We analyze the canonical nonlinear pricing model with limited information. A seller offers a menu with a finite number of choices to a continuum of buyers with a continuum of possible valuations. By revealing an underlying connection to quantization theory, we derive the optimal finite menu for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008752834

I'll See It When I Believe It - A Simple Model of Cognitive Consistency

Yariv, Leeat - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2002

Psychological experiments demonstrate that people exhibit a taste for consistency. Individuals are inclined to interpret new evidence in ways that confirm their pre-existing beliefs. They also tend to change their beliefs to enhance the desirability of their past actions. I present a model that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463891

Efficient Search by Committee

Bergemann, Dirk; Valimaki, Juuso - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2011

This note constructs an efficient mechanism for finding the best candidate for a committee from a sequence of potential candidates. Committee members have independent private values information about the quality of the candidate. The mechanism selects the best candidate according to the standard...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008800354

Market Diffusion with Two-Sided Learning

Bergemann, Dirk; Valimaki, Juuso - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1996

The diffusion of a new product of uncertain value is analyzed in a duopolistic market in continuous time. The two sides of the market, buyers and sellers, learn the true value of the new product over time as a result of experimentation. Buyers have heterogeneous preferences over the products and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463873

Monopoly Pricing of Experience Goods

Bergemann, Dirk; Valimaki, Juuso - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2004

learning and turnover among buyers. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990828

Collaborating

Bonatti, Alessandro; Horner, Johannes - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009

This paper examines moral hazard in teams over time. Agents are collectively engaged in an uncertain project, and their individual efforts are unobserved. Free-riding leads not only to a reduction in effort, but also to procrastination. The collaboration dwindles over time, but never ceases as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005000297

Market Experimentation and Pricing

Bergemann, Dirk; Valimaki, Juuso - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1996

We present a continuous-time model of Bayesian learning in a duopolistic market. Initially the value of one product … externality leads to too much learning. Buyers do not consider the impact of their experimentation on other buyers while the … and allocations in this two-sided learning model. The analysis is presented for a finite number of buyers as well as for a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005093954

The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping

Bergemann, Dirk; Hege, Ulrich - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2001

This paper considers the financing of a research project under uncertainty about the time of completion and the probability of eventual success. The uncertainty about future success gradually diminishes with the arrival of addtional funding. The entrepreneur controls the funds and can divert...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087360