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Noldeke, Georg; Samuelson, Larry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2015

underlying implementation duality. We show how this duality can be used to obtain a sharpening of the taxation principle, to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011201348

Identification and Estimation in Two-Sided Matching Markets

Agarwal, Nikhil; Diamond, William - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013

We study estimation and non-parametric identification of preferences in two-sided matching markets using data from a single market with many agents. We consider a model in which preferences of each side of the market are vertical, utility is non-transferable and the observed matches are pairwise...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895674

Relational Contracts with Subjective Peer Evaluations

Deb, Joyee; Li, Jin; Mukherjee, Arijit - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2015

We study optimal contracting in a setting where a firm repeatedly interacts with multiple workers, and can compensate them based on publicly available performance signals as well as privately reported peer evaluations. If the evaluation and the effort provision are done by different workers (as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011210467

Dynamic Moral Hazard without Commitment

Horner, Johannes; Samuelson, Larry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2015

We study a discrete-time model of repeated moral hazard without commitment. In every period, a principal finances a project, choosing the scale of the project and a contingent payment plan for an agent, who has the opportunity to appropriate the returns of a successful project unbeknownst the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011170126

Mechanism Design with Limited Information: The Case of Nonlinear Pricing

Bergemann, Dirk; Shen, Ji; Xu, Yun; Yeh, Edmund M. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2010

We analyze the canonical nonlinear pricing model with limited information. A seller offers a menu with a finite number of choices to a continuum of buyers with a continuum of possible valuations. By revealing an underlying connection to quantization theory, we derive the optimal finite menu for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008752834

The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade

Gerardi, Dino; Horner, Johannes; Maestri, Lucas - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2010

This paper solves for the set of equilibrium payoffs in bargaining with interdependent values when the informed party makes all offers, as discounting vanishes. The seller of a good is informed of its quality, which affects both his cost and the buyer's valuation, but the buyer is not. To...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011075769

The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade

Gerardi, Dino; Horner, Johannes; Maestri, Lucas - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2010

We examine the buyer-seller problem under different levels of commitment. The seller is informed of the quality of the good, which affects both his cost and the buyer’s valuation, but the buyer is not. We characterize the allocations that can be achieved through mechanisms in which, unlike...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008456248

Ex Post Implementation

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2005

monotonicity condition that is necessary and -- in economic environments -- sufficient for full implementation in ex post …, ex post implementation can be achieved in the direct mechanism. We show by means of two classic examples that ex post … implementation). The single unit auction with interdependent valuations is shown to satisfy ex post monotonicity but not Maskin …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463973

Rationalizable Implementation

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009

This note studies (full) implementation of social choice functions under complete information in (correlated …) rationalizable strategies. The monotonicity condition shown by Maskin (1999) to be necessary for Nash implementation is also …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004998323

Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2008

robust implementation. Robust monotonicity is strictly stronger than both Maskin monotonicity (necessary and almost … sufficient for complete information implementation) and ex post monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for ex post … implementation). It is equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity on all type spaces. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087384