Similar Search Results

Transparency and Distressed Sales under Asymmetric Information

Fuchs, William; Ory, Aniko; Skrzypacz, Andrzej - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2015

We analyze price transparency in a dynamic market with private information and correlated values. Uninformed buyers compete inter- and intra-temporarily for a good sold by an informed seller suffering a liquidity shock. We contrast public versus private price offers. In a two-period case all...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011165636

Bargaining and Markets: Complexity and the Walrasian Outcome

Sabourian, Hamid - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2000

are no transaction costs, the outcome of this matching and bargaining game should be the unique competitive equilibrium … equilibrium that survives is the unique competitive outcome. This will be done both for the random matching and for the voluntary … matching models. Thus the paper demonstrates that complexity costs might have a role in providing a justification for the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593559

Pricing in Matching Markets

Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; Samuelson, Larry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2010

Different markets are cleared by different types of prices -- a universal price for all buyers and sellers in some markets, seller-specific prices that are uniform across buyers in others, and personalized prices tailored to both the buyer and the seller in yet others. We introduce the notion of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008545756

Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets

Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; Samuelson, Larry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2011

make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premuneration values -- the values to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009221543

Matching with Incomplete Information

Liu, Quingmin; Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; … - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2012

A large literature uses matching models to analyze markets with two-sided heterogeneity, studying problems such as the … matching of students to schools, residents to hospitals, husbands to wives, and workers to firms. The analysis typically … matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual problem is to formulate a notion of a blocking pair …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010686932

Aggregation of Expert Opinions

Gerardi, Dino; McLean, Richard; Postlewaite, Andrew - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2005

Conflicts of interest arise between a decision maker and agents who have information pertinent to the problem because of differences in their preferences over outcomes. We show how the decision maker can extract the information by distorting the decisions that will be taken, and show that only...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005464015

The Implementation Duality

Noldeke, Georg; Samuelson, Larry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2015

We use the theory of abstract convexity to study adverse-selection principal-agent problems and two-sided matching … for stable outcomes featuring positive assortative matching in a matching model. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011201348

The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade

Gerardi, Dino; Horner, Johannes; Maestri, Lucas - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2010

This paper solves for the set of equilibrium payoffs in bargaining with interdependent values when the informed party makes all offers, as discounting vanishes. The seller of a good is informed of its quality, which affects both his cost and the buyer's valuation, but the buyer is not. To...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011075769

The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade

Gerardi, Dino; Horner, Johannes; Maestri, Lucas - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2010

We examine the buyer-seller problem under different levels of commitment. The seller is informed of the quality of the good, which affects both his cost and the buyer’s valuation, but the buyer is not. We characterize the allocations that can be achieved through mechanisms in which, unlike...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008456248

Simple Agents, Intelligent Markets

Jamal, Karim; Maier, Michael; Sunder, Shyam - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2012

Attainment of rational expectations equilibria in asset markets calls for the price system to disseminate agents’ private information to others. Markets populated by human agents are known to be capable of converging to rational expectations equilibria. This paper reports comparable market...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011207378