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Fang, Hanming; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2003

valuation as well as noisy signals about her opponentÌs private valuation. In such multidimensional private value auction … revenue ranking; while the second price auction is always efficient allocatively, the first price auction may be inefficient … auction. We also show that auction mechanisms provide different incentives for bidders to acquire costly information about …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463947

Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach

Bergemann, Dirk; Strack, Philipp - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2014

We characterize the revenue-maximizing mechanism for time separable allocation problems in continuous time. The valuation of each agent is private information and changes over time. At the time of contracting every agent privately observes his initial type which influences the evolution of his...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011124283

Simple Agents, Intelligent Markets

Jamal, Karim; Maier, Michael; Sunder, Shyam - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2012

Attainment of rational expectations equilibria in asset markets calls for the price system to disseminate agents’ private information to others. Markets populated by human agents are known to be capable of converging to rational expectations equilibria. This paper reports comparable market...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011207378

Minimally Complex Exchange Mechanisms: Emergence of Prices, Markets, and Money

Dubey, Pradeep; Sahi, Siddhartha; Shubik, Martin - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2014

We consider abstract exchange mechanisms wherein individuals submit "diversified" offers in m commodities, which are then redistributed to them. Our first result is that if the mechanism satisfies certain natural conditions embodying "fairness" and "convenience" then it admits unique prices, in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817223

Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach

Bergemann, Dirk; Strack, Philipp - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2014

We characterize the profit-maximizing mechanism for repeatedly selling a non-durable good in continuous time. The valuation of each agent is private information and changes over time. At the time of contracting every agent privately observes his initial type which influences the evolution of his...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895641

Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction

Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Benjamin; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013

We study how the outcomes of a private-value first price auction can vary with bidders' information, for a fixed …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895653

Sequential Information Disclosure in Auctions

Bergemann, Dirk; Wambach, Achim - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013

We consider the design of an optimal auction in which the seller can determine the allocation and the disclosure rule … sequential disclosure rule, implemented in an ascending price auction. In the optimal disclosure mechanism, each losing bidder … learns his true valuation, but the winning bidder only learns that his valuation is sufficiently high to win the auction. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895662

Selling Cookies

Bergemann, Dirk; Bonatti, Alessandro - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013

We develop a model of data pricing and targeted advertising. A monopolistic data provider determines the price to access "cookies," i.e., informative signals about individual consumers' preferences. The demand for information is generated by advertisers who seek to tailor their spending to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895666

Should Auctions be Transparent?

Bergemann, Dirk; Horner, Johannes - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2010

minimal disclosure regime each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction. In equilibrium the allocation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895667

Selling Cookies

Bergemann, Dirk; Bonatti, Alessandro - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013

We analyze data pricing and targeted advertising. Advertisers seek to tailor their spending to the value of each consumer. A monopolistic data provider sells cookies. informative signals about individual consumers' preferences. We characterize the set of consumers targeted by the advertisers and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895683