We study equilibrium determination in an environment where two kinds of agents have different information sets: The fully informed agents know the structure of the model and observe histories of all exogenous and endogenous variables. The less informed agents observe only a strict subset of the...

Economic theories are often encoded in equilibrium models that cannot be directly estimated because they lack features that, while inessential to the theoretical mechanism that is central to the specific theory, would be essential to fit the data well. We propose an econometric approach that...

We study equilibrium determination in an environment where two kinds of agents have different information sets: The fully informed agents know the structure of the model and observe histories of all exogenous and endogenous variables. The less informed agents observe only a strict subset of the...

Economic theories are often encoded in equilibrium models that cannot be directly estimated because they lack features that, while inessential to the theoretical mechanism that is central to the specific theory, would be essential to fit the data well. We propose an econometric approach that...