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Risk, Reward and Uncertainty in Buyer-Seller Transactions - The Seller's View on Combining Posted Prices and Auctions -

Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kröger, Sabine - 2023

In Buy-It-Now auctions, sellers can post a take-it-or-leave-it price offer prior to an auction. While the literature …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467862

Cross-game Learning and Cognitive Ability in Auctions

Giebe, Thomas; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kocher, Martin G. - 2022

cognitive skills. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467730

The price of advice

Eső, Péter; Szentes, Balázs - 2004

We develop a model of consulting (advising) where the role of the consultant is that she can reveal signals to her client which refine the client’s original private estimate of the profitability of a project. Importantly, only the client can observe or evaluate these signals, the consultant...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273821

Private Information in Sequential Common-Value Auctions

Hörner, Johannes; Jamison, Julian - 2006

We study an in.nitely-repeated .rst-price auction with common values. Initially, bid-ders receive independent private …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266284

Sweet Lemons: Mitigating Collusion in Organizations

Pollrich, Martin; von Negenborn, Colin - 2018

This paper shows that the possibility of collusion between an agent and a supervisor imposes no restrictions on the set of implementable social choice functions (SCF) and associated payoff vectors. Any SCF and any payoff profile that are implementable if the supervisor′s information was public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932965

Asymmetric Auction Experiments With(out) Commonly Known Beliefs

Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2002

Are commonly known beliefs essential for bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions? Our experimental results suggest that not informing participants how values are randomly generated does not change behavior much and may even make it appear more rational.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867012

Optimal dynamic auctions

Pai, Mallesh; Vohra, Rakesh V. - 2008

We consider a dynamic auction problem motivated by the traditional single-leg, multi-period revenue management problem …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276989

Bayesian implementation and rent extraction in a multi-dimensional procurement problem

Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2018

We consider a multi-dimensional procurement problem in which sellers have private information about their costs and about a possible design flaw. The information about the design flaw is necessarily correlated. We solve for the optimal Bayesian procurement mechanism that implements the efficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011985277

Ex-Post Optimal Knapsack Procurement

Jarman, Felix; Meisner, Vincent - 2017

settings in which the class of optimal mechanisms has a deferred acceptance auction representation which allows an … implementation with a descending-clock auction. Only in the case of symmetric projects do price clocks descend synchronously such …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932892

Optimal Cost Overruns: Procurement Auctions with Renegotiation

Herweg, Fabian; Schwarz, Marco A. - 2017

procedure: The procurer awards the contract via a price-only auction and cannot commit not to renegotiate. If cost differences … price exceeds the initial price. Moreover, the procurer cannot benefit from using a multi-dimensional auction, i.e., under … the optimal scoring auction each supplier proposes the standard design. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932921