In an epistemic framework due to Aumann we characterize the condition on the rationality of the players that is both necessary and sufficient to imply backward induction in perfect information games in agent form. This condition requires each player to know that the players are rational at...

We extend the notions of evolutionary stability and, for the first time, that of neutral stability to asymmetric games played between two populations. Stability with respect to simultaneous entry of a small proportion of mutants into both populations is considered. Allocations where neither...

The results of an experiment are reported where subjects played within a repeated random matching environment a simple game in extensive form. In this game backward induction based on the focal-point outcome in subgame yields an outcome different from the one that would be deduced using forward...

We call a set of strategies "uniformly evolutionary stable" if the following holds after a small mutation of a monomorphic population playing a strategy in the set: a) No mutant strategy can spread. b) Mutant strategies not in the set will be driven out. c) The meaning of a "small mutation" can...

Consider a large population of individuals that are repeatedly randomly matched to play a cyclic 2x2 game such as Matching Pennies with fixed roles assigned in the game. Some learn by sampling previous play of a finite number of other individuals in the same role. We analyze population dynamics...