Global games and Poisson games have been proposed to address equilibrium indeterminacy in Coordination games. The former assume that agents face idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals, whereas the latter model the number of actual players as a Poisson random variable to capture...

We investigate experimentally the impact of cognitive and affective empathy on behavior. A novelty of the study is that we do so directly without invoking responses to questionnaires, but by manipulating the state of hunger of participants in the single-shot Dictator game during the holy month...

The design and evaluation of environmental policy requires the incorporation of time and risk elements as many environmental outcomes extend over long time periods and involve a large degree of uncertainty. Understanding how individuals discount and evaluate risks with respect to environmental...

We study experimentally the effect on individual behavior of comparative, but payoff-irrelevant, information in a near-minimal group setting. Specifically, in each round, group members see the groups' cumulative payoffs, which consist of an aggregation of the earnings of each member of the group...

Errors are common in strategic situations. We use a genetic algorithm to simulate the evolution of error-prone finite automata in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game. In particular, the automata are subjected to implementation and perception errors. The computational experiments assess whether...

Linear altruism is a functional form used extensively in outcome-based models of social preferences: the underlying assumption is that individuals have a utility over monetary outcome profiles that depends on their and other players' payments. Behavior in strategic interactions is explained as a...

The value of information is examined in a single-agent environment with unawareness. Although the agent has a correct prior about events he is aware of and has a clear understanding of his available actions and payoffs, his unawareness may lead him to commit information pro- cessing errors and...

The value of information and the possibility of speculation are examined in an environment with unawareness. Although agents have “correct†prior beliefs about events they are aware of and have a clear understanding of their available actions and payoffs, their unawareness may lead...

This paper provides a set-theoretic model of knowledge and unawareness. A new property called Awareness Leads to Knowledge shows that unawareness of theorems not only constrains an agent's knowledge, but also, can impair his reasoning about what other agents know. For example, in contrast to Li...

We report results from a sender-receiver cheap talk game, which explores whether an individual's decision to deceive is influenced by a concern for relative standing in a reference group. We show theoretically that positively biased senders, who think they are higher in the deception...