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Sequential bargaining with pure common values and incomplete information on both sides

Schweinzer, Paul - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006

We study the alternating-offer bargaining problem of sharing a common value pie under incomplete information on both sides and no depreciation between two identical players. We characterise the essentially unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game which turns out to be in gradually...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005739683

Sequential bargaining with pure common values

Schweinzer, Paul - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006

We study the alternating-offers bargaining problem of assigning an indivisible and commonly valued object to one of two players in return for some payment among players. The players are asymmetrically informed about the objectâ€™s value and have veto power over any settlement. There is no...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785835

First-mover disadvantage

Mylovanov, Tymofiy - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005

This note considers a bargaining environment with two-sided asymmetric information and quasilinear preferences in which parties select bargaining mechanism after learning their valuations. I demonstrate that sometimes the buyer achieves a higher ex-ante payoff if the bargaining mechanism is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785853

Informational opacity and honest certification

Pollrich, Martin; Wagner, Lilo - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

This paper studies the interaction of information disclosure and reputational concerns in certification markets. We argue that by revealing less precise information a certifier reduces the threat of capture. Opaque disclosure rules may reduce profits but also constrain feasible bribes. For large...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010929706

Honest Certification and the Threat of Capture

Strausz, Roland - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2004

This paper derives conditions under which reputation enables certifiers to resist capture. These conditions alone have … natural monopoly. 3) Price competition tends to a monopolization. The results derive from a general principle of reputation … efficient market institutions that sell reputation as a service to other firms. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785822

The Effect of Reputation on Selling Prices in Auctions

Gürtler, Oliver; Grund, Christian - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006

In economic approaches it is often argued that reputation considerations influence the behavior of individuals or firms … and that reputation influences the outcome of markets. Empirical evidence is rare though. In this contribution we argue … that a positive reputation of sellers should have an effect on selling prices. Analyzing auctions of popular DVDs at eBay …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785862

Observable Reputation Trading

Hakenes, Hendrik; Peitz, Martin - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006

Is the reputation of a firm tradable when the change in ownership is observable? We consider a competitive market in …-value customers. Hence reputation is a tradable intangible asset, although ownership change is observable. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785913

Incentives, Reputation and the Allocation of Authority

Englmaier, Florian; Filipi, Ales; Singh, Ravi - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

behavior, but may cause the manager to pursue conservative courses of action to preserve his reputation. This undermines the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008581228

Incomplete Contracting, Renegotiation, and Expectation-Based Loss Aversion

Herweg, Fabian; Karle, Heiko; Müller, Daniel - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

We consider a simple trading relationship between an expectation-based loss-averse buyer and profit-maximizing sellers. When writing a long-term contract the parties have to rely on renegotiations in order to ensure materially efficient trade ex post. The type of the concluded long-term contract...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011140976

Reference Points in Renegotiations: The Role of Contracts and Competition

Bartling, Björn; Schmidt, Klaus M. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

Several recent papers argue that contracts provide reference points that affect ex post behavior. We test this hypothesis in a canonical buyer-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010860227