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An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis

Hörisch, Hannah; Strassmair, Christina - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

Crime has to be punished, but does punishment reduce crime? We conduct a neutrally framed laboratory experiment to test … of punishment. In our experiment, subjects can steal from another participant's payoff. Deterrent incentives vary across …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785872

Is the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? An experiment

Hörisch, Hannah - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

We implement the Rawlsian veil of ignorance in the laboratory. Our experimental design allows separating the effects of risk and social preferences behind the veil of ignorance. Subjects prefer more equal distributions behind than in front of the veil of ignorance, but only a minority acts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785895

The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism â€“ Experimental Evidence and New Theories

Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005

Chapter written for the Handbook of Reciprocity, Gift-Giving and Altruism …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785902

How Does Socio-Economic Status Shape a Child's Personality?

Thomas, Deckers; Armin, Falk; Fabian, Kosse; Hannah, … - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2015

personality we investigate encompass time preferences, risk preferences, and altruism, as well as crystallized and fluid IQ. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011252547

Free Riding in the Lab and in the Field

Englmaier, Florian; Gebhardt, Georg - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

We run a public good experiment in the field and in the lab with (partly) the same subjects. The field experiment is a … true natural field experiment as subjects do not know that they are exposed to an experimental variation. We can show that … subjects' behavior in the classic lab public good experiment correlates with their behavior in the structurally comparable …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727879

On the legitimacy of coercion for the nancing of public goods

Bierbrauer, Felix - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

The literature on public goods has shown that e?cient outcomes are impossible if participation constraints have to be respected. This paper addresses the question whether they should be imposed. It asks under what conditions e?ciency considerations justify that individuals are forced to pay for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005026614

Plaintiffs exploiting Plaintiffs

Stremitzer, Alexander - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

We consider a model of a single defendant and N plaintiffs where the total cost of litigation is fixed on the part of the plaintiffs and shared among the members of a suing coalition. By settling and dropping out of the coalition, a plaintiff therefore creates a negative externality on the other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005739656

Providing Public Goods Without Strong Sanctioning Institutions

Gerber, Anke; Wichardt, Philipp C. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007

This paper proposes a simple mechanism aimed to establish positive contributions to public goods in the absence of powerful institutions to sanction free-riders. The idea of the mechanism is to require players to commit to the public good by paying a deposit prior to the contribution stage. If...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005739660

Size and soft budget constraints

Crivelli, Ernesto; Staal, Klaas - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006

There is much evidence against the so-called "too big to fail" hypothesis in the case of bailouts to sub-national governments. We look at a model where districts of different size provide local public goods with positive spillovers. Matching grants of a central government can induce...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005739687

Informative Voting and the Samuelson Rule

Bierbrauer, Felix; Sahm, Marco - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006

We study the classical free-rider problem in public goods provision in a large economy with uncertainty about the average valuation of the public good. Individual preferences over public goods are shaped by a skill and a taste parameter. We use a mechanism design approach to solve for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785911