Similar Search Results

Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-Up Problem

Siemens, Ferdinand von - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005

necessities of signalling are shown to generate very strong investment incentives. These incentives are based on the desire not to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785933

On and Off Contract Remedies

Brooks, Richard; Stremitzer, Alexander - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

A party dissatisfied with the contractual performance of a counterparty is typically able to pursue a variety of legal recourses. Within this apparent variety lurk two fundamental alternatives. The aggrieved party may (i) â€œaffirmâ€ the contract and seek money damages or specific...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008587458

Externalities, Communication and the Allocation of Decision Rights

Bester, Helmut - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005

This paper views authority as the right to undertake decisions that impose externalities on other members of the organization. When only decision rights can be contractually assigned to one of the organizationâ€™s stakeholders, the optimal assignment minimizes the resulting inefficiencies...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785804

Externalities and the Allocation of Decision Rights in the Theory of the Firm

Bester, Helmut - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2004

This paper views authority as the right to undertake decisions that have external effects on other members of the organization. Because of contractual incompleteness, monetary incentives are insufficient to internalize these effects in the decision makerâ€™s objective. The optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785919

Fairness, Adverse Selection, and Employment Contracts

Siemens, Ferdinand von - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005

extent of their fairness concerns. Fairness is modelled as inequity aversion, where fair-minded workers suffer if their … colleagues get more income net of production costs. Screening workers with equal productivity but different fairness concerns is … the fraction of fair-minded workers. As a result, fairness might influence the employment contracts of all workers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785856

Exit Options and the Allocation of Authority

Bester, Helmut; Krähmer, Daniel - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

We analyze the optimal allocation of authority in an organization whose members have conflicting preferences. One party has decision-relevant private information, and the party who obtains authority decides in a self-interested way. As a novel element in the literature on decision rights, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010660824

Standard Breach Remedies, Quality Thresholds, and Cooperative Investments

Stremitzer, Alexander - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

When investments are non-verifiable, inducing cooperative investments with simple contracts may not be as difficult as previously thought. Indeed, modeling 'expectation damages' close to legal practice, we show that the default remedy of contract law induces the first best. Yet, in order to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785883

Expectation Damages, Divisible Contracts, and Bilateral Investment

Ohlendorf, Susanne - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

This paper examines the efficiency of expectation damages as a breach remedy in a bilateral trade setting with renegotiation and relationship-specific investment by the buyer and the seller. As demonstrated by Edlin and Reichelstein (1996), no contract that specifies only a fixed quantity and a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785836

Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights

Fehr, Ernst; Kremhelmer, Susanne; Schmidt, Klaus M. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2004

Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments confirm the property rights approach by showing that the ownership structure affects relationship-specific investments and that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005739653

Exit Options in Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information

Bester, Helmut; Krähmer, Daniel - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

This paper analyzes bilateral contracting in an environment with contractual incompleteness and asymmetric information. One party (the seller) makes an unverifiable quality choice and the other party (the buyer) has private information about its valuation. A simple exit option contract, which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785786