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Ex post information rents and disclosure in sequential screening

Krähmer, Daniel; Strausz, Roland - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post information. When the agentâ€™s ex...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011140962

Procurement and Predation: Dynamic Sourcing from Financially Constrained Suppliers

Arve, Malin - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

This paper studies the interaction between financially constrained and financially strong firms on a procurement market. It characterizes and discusses a procurement agencyâ€™s optimal response when faced with financially asymmetric firms. By considering a dynamic setting, both present and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011140980

The Benefits of Sequential Screening

Krähmer, Daniel; Strausz, Roland - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

This paper considers the canonical sequential screening model and shows that when the agent has an expost outside option, the principal does not benefit from eliciting the agentâ€™s information sequentially. Unlike in the standard model without expost outside options, the optimal contract...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011140990

Auctions vs. Negotiations:The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation

Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011093297

Innovation Contests with Entry Auction

Giebe, Thomas - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

We consider procurement of an innovation from heterogeneous sellers. Innovations are random but depend on unobservable effort and private information. We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for admission to an innovation contest. After the contest,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008583545

Optimal Procurement Contracts with Preâ€“Project Planning

Krähmer, Daniel; Strausz, Roland - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

The paper studies procurement contracts with preâ€“project investigations in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard. To model the procurerâ€™s roblem, we extend a standard sequential screening model to endogenous information acquisition with moral hazard. The optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008633330

Nationalizations and effciency

Crivelli, Ernesto; Staal, Klaas - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

productive efficiency. Nationalization of private ?rms in case unpro?table investments were made, leads to increased allocative … efficiency despite private ownership. The effort level chosen by the managers working for ?rms is also affected by government … intervention with an impact on productive efficiency. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005061654

The Threat of Capital Drain: A Rationale for Public Banks?

Hakenes, Hendrik; Schnabel, Isabel - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006

This paper yields a rationale for why subsidized public banks may be desirable from a regional perspective in a financially integrated economy. We present a model with credit rationing and heterogeneous regions in which public banks prevent a capital drain from poorer to richer regions by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005614486

Plaintiffs exploiting Plaintiffs

Stremitzer, Alexander - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

We consider a model of a single defendant and N plaintiffs where the total cost of litigation is fixed on the part of the plaintiffs and shared among the members of a suing coalition. By settling and dropping out of the coalition, a plaintiff therefore creates a negative externality on the other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005739656

Double-Sided Moral Hazard, Efficiency Wages and Litigation

Gürtler, Oliver; Kräkel, Matthias - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007

We consider a double-sided moral hazard problem where each party can renege on the signed contract since there does not exist any verifiable performance signal. It is shown that ex-post litigation can restore incentives of the agent. Moreover, when the litigation can be settled by the parties...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785810