This paper proposes a novel explanation for the context dependency of individual choices in two-player games. Context dependency refers to the well-established phenomenon that a player, when choosing from a given opportunity set created by the other player’s strategy, chooses differently in...

This note gives a fairly complete statistical description of the Hodrick-Prescott Filter (1997), originally proposed by Leser (1961). It builds on an approach to seasonal adjustment suggested by Leser (1963) and Schlicht (1981, 1984). A moments estimator for the smoothing parameter is proposed...

This note critically evaluates the New Classical Macroeconomics from a Marshallian perspective. Revisiting the famous Keynes-Tinbergen controversy, it is argued that Keynes' criticism comprises the "Lucas critique," and that it is misleading to label this a critique of Keynesian economics. The...

Most economic models are based on the self-interest hypothesis that assumes that all people are exclusively motivated by their material self-interest. In recent years experimental economists have gathered overwhelming evidence that systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis and suggests...

We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral hazard context. Incentive contracts that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are concerned about fairness. Conversely, contracts that...

This paper surveys recent experimental and field evidence on the impact of concerns for fairness, reciprocity and altruism on economic decision making. It also reviews some new theoretical attempts to model the observed behavior.

The estimation of models with time-varying coefficients is usually performed by Kalman-Bucy filtering. The two-sided filter proposed by Schlicht (1988) is statistically and computationally superior to the one-sided Kalman-Bucy filter. This paper describes the estimation procedure and the program...

We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments confirm the property rights approach by showing that the ownership structure affects relationship-specific investments and that subjects attain the most efficient ownership allocation despite starting...

This paper studies the evolution of both characteristics of reciprocity - the willingness to reward friendly behavior and the willingness to punish hostile behavior. Firstly, preferences for rewarding as well as preferences for punishing can survive evolution provided individuals interact within...

This papers describes an estimator for a standard state-space model with coefficients generated by a random walk that is statistically superior to the Kalman filter as applied to this particular class of models. Two closely related estimators for the variances are introduced: A maximum...