Similar Search Results

Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Surplus Extraction

Mezzetti, Claudio - Department of Economics, Leicester University - 2005

If valuations are interdependent and agents observe their own allocation payoffs, then two-stage revelation mechanisms expand the set of implementable decision functions. In a two-stage revelation mechanism agents report twice. In the first stage - before the allocation is decided - they report...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005569942

Overconfidence Can Improve an Agent's Relative and Absolute Performance in Contests

Ludwig, Sandra; Wichardt, Philipp C.; Wickhorst, Hanke - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

This paper suggests a potential rationale for the recent empirical finding that overconfident agents tend to self-select into more competitive environments (e.g. Dohmen and Falk, forthcoming). In particular, it shows that moderate overconfidence in a contest can improve the agent's performance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727202

Information Disclosure in Open Non-Binding Procurement Auctions: an Empirical Study

Stoll, Sebastian; Zöttl, Gregor - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

The outcome of non-binding reverse auctions critically depends on how information is distributed during the bidding … process. We use data from a large European procurement platform to study the impact of different information structures … that on the procurement platform considered bidders indeed are aware of their rivals' characteristics and the buyers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011106292

Auctions in which Losers Set the Price

Mezzetti, Claudio; Tsetlin, Ilia - Department of Economics, Leicester University - 2006

We study auctions of a single asset among symmetric bidders with affiliated values. We show that the second … + 1)-st price auction yields the lowest revenue among all auctions with rationing in which only the winners pay and the …-price, second-price and English auctions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561952

Searching the eBay Marketplace

Sailer, Katharina - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006

from a sequence of eBay auctions. First the aspect of bidding in a marketplace environment is developed. Form the simple … a "reservation bid" for low-price auctions. Extending results from the empirical auction literature and employing a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005121206

On the Lowest-Winning-Bid and the Highest-Losing-Bid Auctions

Mezzetti, Claudio; Tsetlin, Ilia - Department of Economics, Leicester University - 2006

Theoretical models of multi-unit, uniform-price auctions assume that the price is given by the highest losing bid. In … grows large, the bidding functions converge at a linear rate and the prices in the two auctions converge in probability to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005569939

Sequential vs. Single-Round Uniform-Price Auctions

Mezzetti, Claudio; Pekec, Aleksandar; Tsetlin, Ilia - Department of Economics, Leicester University - 2005

We study sequential and single-round uniform-price auctions with affiliated values. We derive symmetric equilibrium for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561919

Fairness, Adverse Selection, and Employment Contracts

Siemens, Ferdinand von - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005

This paper considers a firm whose potential employees have private information on both their productivity and the extent of their fairness concerns. Fairness is modelled as inequity aversion, where fair-minded workers suffer if their colleagues get more income net of production costs. Screening...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649802

Efficient Allocations in Economies with Asymmetric Information when the Realized Frequency of Types is Common Knowledge

Boukouras, Aristotelis; Koufopoulos, Kostas - Department of Economics, Leicester University - 2015

We consider a general economy, where agents have private information about their types. Types can be multi-dimensional and potentially interdependent. We show that, if the realized frequency of types (the exact number of agents for each type) is common knowledge, then a mechanism exists, which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011265724

Why were FIFA World Cup Tickets so cheap?

Eichhorn, Christoph; Sahm, Marco - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007

We examine the pricing decision of a multi-product monopolist in a two-sided market where the type structure of buyers on one side of the market is an important determinant of profit on the other side. In this situation it might be optimal to set prices below the maximum sellout price and to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649820