In the standard independent private values (IPV)model, each bidder’s beliefs about the values of any other bidder is represented by a unique prior. In this paper we relax this assumption and study the question of auction design in an IPV setting characterized by ambiguity: bidders have an...

Online auctions with a fixed end-time often experience a sharp increase in bidding towards the end despite using a proxy-bidding format. We provide a novel explanation of this phenomenon under private values. We study a correlated private values environment in which the seller bids in her own...

We derive necessary and suffcient conditions for data sets composed of state-contingent prices and consumption to be consistent with two prominent models of decision making under ambiguity: variational preferences and smooth ambiguity. The revealed preference conditions for the maxmin expected...

We perturb the bilateral bargaining model by introducing small ambiguity (via the epsilon contamination model) about the agents' types. We assume that the preferences are characterized by ambiguity aversion (Gilboa-Schmeidler). The rest of the setup is exactly as in Myerson and Satterthwaite...