We consider a congested facility where agents can line up at any time they wish after the facility opens (like airplane boarding, or drivers leaving stadium parking lots after a sports event). We show that in Nash equilibrium, within the general family of stochastic queue disciplines with no...

This paper introduces cooperative games arising from multi-depot Chinese postman problems and explores the properties of these games. A multi-depot Chinese postman problem (MDCP) is represented by a connected (di)graph G, a set of k depots that is a subset of the vertices of G, and a...

The core cover of a TU-game is a superset of the core and equals the convex hull of its larginal vectors. A larginal vector corresponds to an ordering of the players and describes the efficient payoff vector giving the first players in the ordering their utopia demand as long as it is still...

This paper introduces a concept of inequality comparisons with ordinal bivariate categorical data. In our model, one population is more unequal than another when they have common arithmetic median outcomes and the first can be obtained from the second by correlation-increasing switches and/or...

We consider the problem of assigning agents to a facility, represented by slots on a line, where only one agent can be served at a time. There is a finite number of agents, and each one wants to be served as close as possible to his preferred slot. We first consider deterministic assignment of...

We analyze a general model of rationing in which agents have baselines, in addition to claims against the (insufficient) endowment of the good to be allocated. Many real-life problems fit this general model (e.g., bankruptcy with prioritized claims, resource allocation in the public health care...

We consider a class of three-player queuing games where players independently choose when to arrive at a bottleneck facility that serves only one at a time. Players are impatient for service but cannot arrive before the facility opens and they dislike time spent in queue. We derive the...

We consider the problem of distributing the proceeds generated from a joint venture in which the participating agents are hierarchically organized. We characterize a family of allocation rules ranging from the so-called zero-transfer rule (which awards agents in the hierarchy their individually...

We introduce a new operator for general rationing problems in which, besides conflicting claims, individual baselines play an important role in the rationing process. The operator builds onto ideas of composition, which are not only frequent in rationing, but also in related problems such as...

We consider a cost sharing problem among agents on a line. The problem is closely related to the classic airport game, but in our model agents are characterized by their location, rather than their needed runway length. We characterize a family of cost allocation rules in which agents pay a...