We propose a class of multiple-prior representations of preferences under ambiguity where the belief the decision-maker (DM) uses to evaluate an uncertain prospect is the outcome of a game played by two conflicting forces, Pessimism and Optimism. The model does not restrict the sign of the DM's...

This paper introduces an axiomatic model of decision making where a person's subjective judgment as to the likelihood of different states of nature depends upon her anticipated payoff in those states. In the resulting representation the payoff consequences of an event affect beliefs as if they...

Economists often estimate economic models on data and use the point estimates as a stand-in for the truth when studying the model’s implications for optimal decision-making. This practice ignores model ambiguity, exposes the decision problem to misspecification, and ultimately leads to...

Loss aversion postulates that people prefer avoiding losses over acquiring gains of equal size. It is a central part of prospect theory and, according to Daniel Kahneman, “the most significant contribution of psychology to behavioral economics” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 300). It has powerful...

We challenge the standard definition of economic rationality as consistency by making use of a novel distinction between axioms of decision theory: consistency and preference axioms. We argue that this distinction has been overlooked by the literature and, as a result, evidence that consistency...