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English versus Vickrey auctions with loss averse bidders
Wangenheim, Jonas von - 2017
the (endogenous) equilibrium outcome. If agents update their reference point during the auction, the arrival of … auction yields strictly higher revenue than the English auction, violating the well known revenue equivalence. Thus, dynamic … loss aversion offers a novel explanation for empirically observed differences between these auction formats. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011762533
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English versus Vickrey auctions with loss averse bidders
Wangenheim, Jonas von - 2019
the (endogenous) equilibrium outcome. If agents update their reference point during the auction, the arrival of … auction yields strictly higher revenue than the English auction, violating the well known revenue equivalence. Thus, dynamic … loss aversion offers a novel explanation for empirically observed differences between these auction formats. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011959283
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A small volume reduction that melts down the market : auctions with endogenous rationing
Ehrhart, Karl-Martin; Hanke, Ann-Katrin; Ott, Marion - 2020
Auctions with endogenous rationing have been introduced to stimulate competition. Such (procurement) auctions reduce the volume put out to tender when competition is low. This paper finds a strong negative effect of endogenous rationing on participation when bid-preparation is costly,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012195628
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Cross-game learning and cognitive ability in auctions
Giebe, Thomas; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kocher, Martin; … - 2022
cognitive skills. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014476711
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Risk, reward and uncertainty in buyer-seller transactions : the seller's view on combining posted prices and auctions
Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kröger, Sabine - 2023
In Buy-It-Now auctions, sellers can post a take-it-or-leave-it price offer prior to an auction. While the literature …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014477420
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The benefits of auctioneer competition : merging auctions and adding auctioneers
Heczko, Alexander; Kittsteiner, Thomas; Ott, Marion - 2023
In a lab experiment, we analyze the benefits of increasing competition on auction platforms hosting multiple …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014384448
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Mechanism design for unequal societies
Groh, Carl-Christian; Reuter, Marco - 2023
unallocated. We also highlight how our mechanism can be implemented as an auction with minimum bids and bidding subsidies. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014438989
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Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release
Schweizer, Nikolaus; Szech, Nora - 2015
Auctions are the allocation-mechanisms of choice whenever goods and information in markets are scarce. Therefore, understanding how information affects welfare and revenues in these markets is of fundamental interest. We introduce new statistical concepts, k- and k-m-dispersion, for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010529939
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The quantitative view of Myerson regularity
Schweizer, Nikolaus; Szech, Nora - 2015 - December 2015
results for quantitative auction and mechanism design. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011406392
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Bayesian implementation and rent extraction in a multi-dimensional procurement problem
Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2018
We consider a multi-dimensional procurement problem in which sellers have private information about their costs and about a possible design flaw. The information about the design flaw is necessarily correlated. We solve for the optimal Bayesian procurement mechanism that implements the efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011976063