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We investigate a random proposer bargaining game with a dead line. A bounded time interval is divided into bargaining periods of equal length and we study the limit of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome as the number of bargaining periods goes to infinity while the dead line is kept fixed....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503005
Matching markets can be unstable when individuals prefer to be matched to a partner who also wants to be matched with … preferences exist, significantly decrease stability in matching markets, and are driven both by belief-based and preference …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014476792
paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for … acceptance mechanism can achieve stability. These results provide insights into non-standard preferences in matching markets, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014478421
This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587476
This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012648091
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012433566
Agents in a finite two-sided market make costly investments and are then matched assortatively based on these investments. Besides signaling complementary types, investments also generate benefits for partners. We shed light on quantitative properties of the equilibrium investment behavior. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011758059
Students participating in centralized admissions procedures do not typically have access to the information used to determine their matched school, such as other students' preferences or school priorities. This can lead to doubts about whether their matched schools were computed correctly (the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014477372
that the class of implementable social choice rules in core equilibria is unaltered by farsighted reasoning. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503093
individually rational matching, the matching has many good properties like Pareto optimality and stability. If preferences satisfy … matching. These properties guarantee also that the student proposing Deferred Acceptance algorithm (DA) and the Top Trading … Cycles algorithm (TTC) produce the same matching as IMB. We compare these results with some well-known results about when DA …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503062