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We study how institutional design influences moral transgression. People are heterogeneous in their feelings of guilt and can share guilt with others. Institutions determine the number of supporters necessary for immoral outcomes to occur. With more supporters required, every supporter can share...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009763121
Existing theoretical and experimental studies have established that unanimity is a poor decision rule for promoting … responsibility for the committee's decision is equally distributed across all agents. We test our predictions in a controlled … are ultimately more likely to make the optimal decision. Idiosyncratic payoffs such as a moral bias thus present a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011696383
Our study compares individual and team bidding in standard auction formats: first-price, second-price and ascending-price (English) auctions with independent private values. In a laboratory experiment, we find that individuals overbid more than teams in first-price auctions and deviate more from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012500699
decision-making process of hiring committees within a large private company. In the hiring process, committee members first … decision. We find that committees' final hiring decisions are systematically less aligned with the initial recommendations of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014480222
The common use of majority rule in group decision making is puzzling. In theory, it inequitably favors the proposer …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011762571
This paper shows that the public provision of private goods may be justified on pure efficiency grounds in an environment where individuals have relative consumption concerns. By providing private goods, governments directly intervene in the consumption structure, and thereby have an instrument...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011626732
Reference-dependent preferences can explain several puzzling observations about organizational change. We introduce a dynamic model in which a loss-neutral firm bargains with loss-averse workers over organizational change and wages. We show that change is often stagnant or slow for long periods...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014495909
We study the random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict preferences. We show that there exists no mechanism which is unanimous, strategy-proof and envy-free. Weakening the first requirement to q-unanimity – i.e., when every agent ranks a different object at the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013191476
Much economic analysis derives policy recommendations based on social welfare criteria intended to model the preferences of a policy maker. Yet, little is known about policy maker’s normative views in a way amenable to this use. In a behavioral experiment, we elicit German legislators’...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014305744
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014281273