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This paper presents an analysis of general time preferences in the canonical Rubinstein (1982) model of bargaining, allowing for arbitrarily history-dependent strategies. I derive a simple sufficient structure for optimal punishments and thereby fully characterize (i) the set of equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011705183
This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders’ fairness attitudes. In equilibrium fairness matters because of market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587476
This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders’ fairness attitudes. In equilibrium fairness matters because of market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012648091
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012433528
negotiated. The success of such negotiations depends on how they are designed. In the context of international climate change … a public good. Subjects differ in their benefits and costs of cooperation. Participation in the negotiations and all …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012500234
We provide causal evidence that patience is a significant source of bargaining power. Generalizing the Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model to arbitrarily non-stationary discounting, we first show that dynamic consistency across bargaining rounds is sufficient for a unique equilibrium, which we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014279476
I revisit the Rubinstein (1982) model for the classic problem of price hag- gling and show that bargaining can become a “trap,” where equilibrium leaves one party strictly worse off than if no transaction took place (e.g., the equilibrium price exceeds a buyer’s valuation). This arises...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013191479
-only auction (discouraging early information exchange) and bilateral negotiations with a preselected seller (reducing competition …). Bilateral negotiations are superior if potential design improvements are important, if renegotiation is particularly costly, and … if the buyer's bargaining position is strong. Moreover, negotiations provide stronger incentives for sellers to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011596132