In Buy-It-Now auctions, sellers can post a take-it-or-leave-it price offer prior to an auction. While the literature …

unallocated. We also highlight how our mechanism can be implemented as an auction with minimum bids and bidding subsidies. …

settings in which the class of optimal mechanisms has a deferred acceptance auction representation which allows an … implementation with a descending-clock auction. Only in the case of symmetric projects do price clocks descend synchronously such …

We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction, the second-price sealed-bid auction, and the … all-pay sealed-bid auction in a laboratory experiment where bidders can signal information through their bidding behaviour …-bid auction in which the bidders’ payments are revealed outperforms the other mechanisms in terms of revenue, while this mechanism …

auction makes participation observable via an entry fee. With convex signaling concerns, optimal auctions are fully … transparent: every standard auction, which reveals all bids yields maximal revenue. With concave signaling concerns there is no …

We study the optimal entry fee in a symmetric private value first-price auction with signaling, in which the … participation decisions and the auction outcome are used by an outside observer to infer the bidders’ types. We show that this … auction has a unique fully separating equilibrium bidding function. When the bidders’ sensibility for the signaling concern is …

cognitive skills. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction …